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INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen 
virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics1 
might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social 
welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the 
profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally 
viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the pat­
entee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringe­
ment combined with increased patent duration, however, can 
substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supra-
1. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 {1998) {"Long delays be­
tween the filing and issuance of biotechnology patents aggravate the problem of concurrent 
fragments. During this period of pendency, there is substantial uncertainty as to the scope of 
patent rights that will ultimately issue."). However, uncertainty has already been shown to 
be desirable in some special cases. First, Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, 
and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. EcoN. 34 {1995); Jerry R. Green & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. EcoN. 20 {1995); 
and Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 29 {1991), have shown that uncertainty about whether follow­
on innovation would infringe a patent might be desirable. See infra note 73. Second, uncer­
tainty about which of two competing innovators' patent-claims on innovation will be valid is 
equivalent to each innovation receiving a small prize in expectation, which might attract 
more innovators to enter an R&D contest. See Richard Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, An Equi­
librium Theory of Rationing, RAND J. EcoN. {forthcoming 1999). Third, uncertainty about 
which claim is valid (which is economically equivalent to joint ownership of the rights to 
produce) can result in more efficient bargaining over the rights. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1027 {1995); Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, 55 
ECONOMETRICA 615 {1987). 
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competitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incen­
tives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that 
preserves the incentive to innovate by giving the patentee the same 
expected profits, but that substantially increases efficiency in com­
parison with an "idealized" patent regime (in which a patentee can 
instantaneously win an injunction to stop infringement). 
Legal scholars have failed to appreciate that unconstrained mo­
nopoly pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees.2 
The last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of dead­
weight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee profit. If soci­
ety wants to use patent profits to induce innovation, it should 
choose the method of producing a particular level of profit that pro­
duces the least cost to society. But allowing patentees to raise price 
all the way to the monopoly level is a little like giving them a license 
to steal car radios - it produces a social cost (to car owners) far 
greater than the private benefit. The dual thesis of this Article is 
that (1) efficient patent policy should strive to give patentees con­
strained market power, and (2) an enforcement regime with uncer­
tainty and delay (in conjunction with the appropriate patent 
duration) may be one way of achieving this policy goal. Even if 
readers ultimately are unwilling to accept uncertainty and delay as 
tools to constrain patentees' market power, the insight that the last 
bit of monopoly pricing provides disproportionately small profits in 
comparison to its social cost should be of continuing independent 
concern to policymakers seeking an optimal enforcement regime. 
Although this Article begins with a reductive mathematical 
model to show how uncertainty and delay can induce limited 
amounts of infringement, the purpose is not to propose a system in 
which the validity of patents is uncertain and only resolved ex post. 
Instead, appreciating how uncertainty and delay can constrain the 
patentee's market power can illuminate practical policy issues. For 
example, our model suggests ways to distinguish between the utility 
of different types of uncertainty. "Type I" uncertainty (which in­
creases the chance that valid patents will not be enforced) is likely 
to be more efficient than "Type II" uncertainty (which increases the 
2. Economists have understood that reducing the price of patented products with com­
pulsory licensing and increasing the patent length (to maintain the patentee's expected 
profit) can increase welfare. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent 
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. EcoN. 106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the 
Scope of Patent Protection Be? 21 RAND J. EcoN. 113 (1990); Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Pat­
ents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. PoL. EcoN. 470 (1982). The core insight of this Article 
is that delay and uncertainty can have the same beneficial effects on limiting the patentee's 
exploitation of market power. 
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chance that invalid patents will be enforced).3 This suggests that 
recent efforts of the Federal Circuit to expand the use of prelimi­
nary injunctions may not be cost-justified - as they are likely to 
expand Type II uncertainty and reduce Type I uncertainty. The 
costs of Type I uncertainty and delay are not as great as previously 
thought, and we may not want to expend substantial resources to 
eliminate this feature of the current system. Appreciating the bene­
fits of uncertainty argues against giving patentees a presumptive 
right to preliminary injunctions against infringement, and militates 
instead in favor of relatively stingy ex post measures of make-whole 
damages. Underinclusive "standards" for determining when a pat­
ent is valid are likely to be more efficient than either "rules" (which 
resolve uncertainty ex ante) or overinclusive standards. 
Courts often argue that (1) patents, as a form of property, must 
include the right to injunctively exclude, and (2) failure to grant 
injunctions will lead to unlimited infringement, which would sub­
stantially undermine a patentee's incentive to innovate.4 We con­
test both of these claims. Instead of accepting the essentialist 
notion that the "very nature" of property is the right to exclude, we 
suggest that the nature of patents should be to offer sufficient re­
wards to stimulate innovation. Denying immediate injunctive relief 
and substituting delayed probabilistic determination with monetary 
damages will only produce limited amounts of infringement and 
need not (especially when combined with extended patent life) re­
duce the ex ante incentive to innovate. 
To highlight the perverse benefits of uncertainty and delay, this 
Article purposely abstracts from addressing which innovations are 
deserving of protection or what reward for innovation would be op­
timal.5 Patent policy has to resolve two core issues: (1) how much 
of a reward should be granted to induce sufficient innovation; and 
(2) how can this desired reward be produced for the innovator with 
the least social inefficiency. This paper takes on the second ques­
tion. Regardless of how much profit society decides to grant a pat-
3. The terms "Type I" and "Type II" are inspired by classical hypothesis testing. As tradi­
tionally defined, the possibility that a true null hypothesis will be rejected is referred to as a 
"TYPe I" error, while the possibility that a false null hypothesis will not be rejected is referred 
to as a "Type II" error. See James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 781, 784 
(1990); infra note 85. We are implicitly defining the null hypothesis to be that a patent is 
valid, but we have no strong view on which type of error should be defined as 'fype I or II. 
4. See infra section III.A. 
5. For leading analyses of these issues, see WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUS, INVENTION, 
GRowrn, AND WELFARE {1969); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A 
Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 422 {1972); and Robert P. Merges & Richard 
R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
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entee, this Article shows that a regime with some uncertainty and 
delay can produce this reward more efficiently than a regime in 
which enforcement is instantaneous and certain. 
A. The Intuition: Why It Is Possible to Restrict Patentees' Market 
Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives 
Before demonstrating how uncertainty and delay restrict market 
power by inducing limited infringement, it is useful to explain why 
restricting patentees' market power is a worthy goal. Two intuitions 
suggest the worth of restricting patentee market power - one re­
lating to fixed and the other to increased patent length. For con­
venience, we will refer to these intuitions as the "stationarity 
intuition" and the "Ramsey intuition." 
The Stationarity Intuition. Small restrictions in the patentee's 
monopoly market power are efficient - even if these restrictions 
reduce the patentee's expected profits. The reason is that the last 
increment by which an unconstrained patentee chooses to increase 
price hurts society much more than it helps the patentee. Because 
an unconstrained patentee maximizes profits by choosing the quan­
tity or price that reaches a flat point - what mathematicians call a 
stationary point - on the profit surface, small changes away from 
the profit-maximizing price or quantity will have only second-order 
effects on profits.6 But small decreases in price will have first-order 
effects on the deadweight loss - so that reductions in price have 




P' ,__ _ _.... 
D 
Marginal Cost 
OM Q' Quantity 
6. The "envelope theorem" also exploits this aspect of the maxima (or minima) of func­
tions. See George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Can Small Deviations from Rationality 
Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria? 15 AM. EcoN. REv. 708 (1985); Ian 
Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the Envelope Theorem, 17 Miss. C. L. 
REv. 21 (1996). 
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The intuition for this result can be seen in Figure 1. A reduction 
in the monopoly price from PM to P' has two effects on the paten­
tee's profits: the lower price reduces the profits on current sales 
(the reduction in profits is represented by the area of rectangle A), 
but the lower price also increases the quantity sold (from QM to Q') 
at a supra-competitive price (this increase in profits is represented 
by the area of rectangle B). So geometrically, the effect on profits 
of lowering the price below the monopoly level is: 
Effect on Profits = Area B - Area A 
The patentee acting as a monopolist would choose a price where 
these two effects on profits were completely offsetting - but even 
reductions below the monopoly price cause a relatively small de­
crease in profits because the increase in profits from additional 
sales (Area B) almost offsets the decrease in profits from a lower 
price (Area A). 
This reduction in profits is especially small in comparison with 
the increase in social welfare (consumer and producer surplus). As 
shown geometrically in Figure 1, the increase in welfare caused by 
lowering the monopoly price is: 
Effect on Welfare = Area B + Area C 
From antitrust scholarship, it is well known that the patentee's loss 
of Area A profits does not reduce social welfare because what the 
patentee loses in this area, the consumer gains. But what is not 
often emphasized is that the effect on profits is much smaller than 
the effect on social welfare. Because of the offsetting profit rectan­
gles, the effect on profits is second-order in comparison with the 
first-order effect on social welfare. 
The next section will show in a simple linear example that re­
ducing the monopoly price by 10% might only reduce the paten­
tee's profits by 1 %, but can reduce the social costs of monopoly by 
19%.7 Because the last bit of monopoly overcharging is so dispro­
portionately damaging, restricting the patentee's monopoly power a 
small amount is likely to increase social welfare. The benefit of re­
ducing the deadweight loss of supra-competitive pricing is likely to 
outweigh the costs of a slightly lower incentive to innovate.8 
The Ramsey Intuition. While the stationarity intuition only per­
tains to small changes away from the profit-maximizing output, a 
7. See infra Table 1. 
8. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 36-37 (describing pathological example in which 
elasticity of innovation with respect to expected profit was extremely high). 
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second intuition applies to even larger reductions in market power. 
To wit: larger restrictions in a patentee's monopoly power are effi­
cient, if the patent's length is increased to keep the patentee's ex­
pected profit constant.9 If we hold patentees' profits constant by 
appropriately lengthening the patent life, consumers would be bet­
ter off living under oligopolistic pricing for a longer period than 
monopoly pricing for a shorter period. The intuition for this trade­
off between market power and duration can be seen as an implica­
tion of inter-temporal "Ramsey pricing."10 
Ramsey pricing minimizes the distortionary effect (read: dead­
weight loss) of generating a given amount of tax revenue. The opti­
mal tax structure for generating a given amount of revenue will 
tend to (1) tax as many goods as possible (so as to create small 
distortions in a broad variety of markets),11 and (2) tax goods with 
inelastic demands more severely than goods with elastic demand. 
The first implication - regarding broad-based tax schemes - is 
particularly relevant to patent policy. 
Allowing a patentee to charge a supra-competitive price is 
analogous to allowing a patentee to impose a tax - because both 
induce deadweight loss. The Ramsey intuition by itself suggests 
that government would want to place a small tax on all products to 
generate a given reward for a patentee. The problem with this ap­
proach is that government does not have sufficient information to 
know how much of a reward is appropriate for a particular product. 
Giving patentees the ability to charge monopoly profits allows the 
government to tie the size of the reward in a rough way to the size 
of consumer surplus created by the patent. Yet even if we limit 
9. This will only be true if the patentee is risk-neutral and if preemptive innovation does 
not independently limit the patentee's ability to profit from the original innovation in later 
years. If patentees are risk-averse, patent duration will need to be lengthened more to main­
tain a constant incentive to innovate. The latter possibility of preemptive innovation is dis­
cussed below with regard to choosing the appropriate discount rate. See infra text 
accompanying notes 49-50. 
10. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcoN. J. 47 
(1927). For a review of the subsequent literature, see William J. Baumol, Ramsey Pricing, in 
4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS 49, 49-51 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 
1987). See also Robert Cooter, Optimal Tax Schedules and Rates: Mirrlees and Ramsey, 68 
AM. EcoN. REv. 756 (1978); Stephen Law, Inter-Temporal Tie-ins: A Case for Tying Intellec­
tual Property (Univ. of New Brunswick Working Paper 98-06, 1998); Frank Mathewson & 
Ralph Wmter, Tying as a Response to Demand Uncertainty, 28 RAND J. EcoN. 566 (1997) 
(arguing that a monopolist might also use tying to implement Ramsey pricing across products 
- instead of charging a monopoly price for the product it has a monopoly on and a competi­
tive price for a related product). 
11. This can be seen as an application of the stationarity intuition in another setting. The 
first increment of taxation has a second-order effect on social welfare but a first-order effect 
on tax revenue. 
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ourselves to reward structures that allow patentees to extract con­
sumer surplus, it is better to spread the patentees' market power 
over multiple years. 
If we view each year (or period) as a separate product, then the 
most efficient way - a la Ramsey - to produce a certain tax reve­
nue (patentee profit) would be to impose some tax on every prod­
uct. We wouldn't expect to tax only some of the goods. But an 
idealized patent regime violates the Ramsey intuition by taxing just 
the first twenty years and imposing no "tax" on subsequent years. 
If the periodic demand curve for the patented product remains con­
stant as time passes12 and becomes more elastic as price increases, 13 
then it will be more efficient to raise the patentee's profits by taxing 
all periods equally than by imposing high taxes on some (early) pe­
riods and no taxes on other (later) periods.14 
A central lesson of "marginalism" is that partial restraint of an 
externality may be much more efficient than either complete re­
straint or no restraint. But current patent law is curiously indiffer­
ent to this traditional economic concern. Under the idealized 
regime, the patentee would have unchecked monopoly power for 
the duration of the patent, and then no legally enforced market 
power for all succeeding years. 
Our approach is consistent with the "ratio test" developed by 
Louis Kaplow.15 Kaplow suggested that in "assessing the desirabil­
ity of retaining a currently permitted practice" it is useful to com-
12. If the demand becomes more elastic over time, then raising most of the revenues in 
the first years may be efficient. But later years should still be "taxed." For example, if the 
demand curve is linear and the x-intercept decreases while the y-intercept remains constant, 
then Ramsey pricing would imply constant taxes over time. In other cases, if the demand 
curve's elasticity increases over time, policy makers will want lower but still positive amounts 
of "taxation" in the later, more elastic periods. In the probabilistic patents model, lower 
taxation in later years could be accomplished by awarding lower expected damages for in­
fringement in later years. For the remainder of this Article, we restrict our attention to con­
stant tax rates (i.e., constant expected damage rates) during the life of the patent. 
13. Most standard demand curves - including all concave, linear, and not overly convex 
demand curves - satisfy this condition. See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 122. Linear demand 
curves become more elastic as price increases - even though the slope of the demand curve 
remains constant - because proportionate increases in price cause increasingly large propor­
tionate reductions in demand. Monopolists will always increase price until they reach an 
elastic portion of the demand curve, and such a portion always exists for sufficiently high 
prices on demand curves that are linear. 
14. The condition that demand becomes more elastic as price increases is stronger than 
necessary. It relates to the second implication of Ramsey taxation, that it is preferable to tax 
inelastically- rather than elastically-demanded goods. If demand is much more inelastic at 
higher prices, it might be preferable to tax a small number of periods at high prices rather 
than a larger number of periods at lower prices. 
15. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REv. 1813 {1984). 
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pare the patentee's incremental reward to the incremental social 
loss resulting from the practice in question, because "[i]n general, 
the higher the ratio, the more desirable the practice."16 When ap­
plying Kaplow's test to patent pricing itself, one finds that allowing 
patentees to exploit full monopoly power produces an extremely 
low17 and hence undesirable ratio - indicating that giving paten­
tees the ability to raise price all the way to the monopoly level is not 
cost justified. The ratio test suggests that policymakers should ana­
lyze the incremental profits per dollar of social loss on various 
dimensions of patent scope. If one margin of protection produces 
lower patentee profits per dollar of social loss than another margin, 
it makes sense to reduce the patentee's entitlement where the ratio 
is low and to expand the patent entitlement where, the ratio is high. 
Doing so can reduce the deadweight loss of patents without reduc­
ing the patentee's expected profits. The Ramsey intuition suggests 
that just this type of trade-off is possible with regard to monopoly 
pricing and duration. 
B. Implementation: How Probabilistic Patents R(fstrain Patentees' 
Market Power 
· 
Probabilistic patents can constrain patentees' market power, be­
cause uncertainty and delay can induce limited amounts of interim 
"infringement."18 If the probability that the patent will be enforced 
is sufficiently low, entrants may find it profitable to produce the 
patented product. The oligopolistic profit that the infringers expect 
to make when the patent is not enforced compensates for the fact 
that the infringers will have to more than disgorge these profits in 
order to make the patentee whole when the patent is enforced. 
Infringement during the patent's life will tend to expand indus­
try output and decrease the market price. This enhanced competi­
tion implements the goal of restraining the patentee's market 
power. The infringers' entry will be limited, however, because the 
marginal benefit of entry is weighed against pro-rata damages. As 
infringers help to drive down the market price, at some point addi­
tional entry will be deterred because the depressed market price 
16. Id. at 1829 n.4, 1831. Kaplow's approach is applied to the copyright issue of "fair use" 
in William W. Fisher Ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1659 
(1988). 
17. Indeed, at the stationary point - the profit-maximizing price - the ratio by defini­
tion is zero. 
18. For convenience, the interim production by nonpatent holders is referred to as "in­
fringement" - even though under a probabilistic regime, there is some probability that the 
"infringer" will not need to pay damages. 
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reduces the profitability of additional production and exacerbates 
expected damages. The amount of this limited infringement is de­
termined by the certainty of enforcement. By changing the 
probability of enforcement, lawmakers can limit patentee market 
power by various degrees. 
Initially, it might seem that using interim infringement to re­
strain industry pricing might substantially decrease the patentee's 
profitability - because the patentee must split the industry profits 
with the infringing entrants.19 This intuition, however, ignores the 
fact that patentees expect damages from infringement. If potential 
infringers enter to the point where they expect to earn zero profits, 
then in expected terms the infringers will be paying all of their prof­
its to the patentee. 
The infringers in this stylized story are not pariahs, but perfect 
agents of society - restraining the excesses of monopoly pricing 
without personal profit. In many contexts, the infringing firms may 
expect to earn positive profits even after paying damages for in­
fringement, but the social benefits of restraining the patentee's mo­
nopoly power may be sufficiently great that allowing profits for 
infringement may still enhance welfare. The next section develops 
a simple model to show how a probabilistic patent regime can re­
duce but not eliminate a patentee's monopoly power by inducing 
limited amounts of infringement. 
I. A SIMPLE MODEL 
To formally capture the effects of uncertainty and delay, this 
section explores how market participants would behave under a 
stylized "probabilistic patent" regime. This regime has two unique 
features: 
(1) a patent holder would only have a right to seek compensatory 
damages after the patent's expiration (patent holders could not 
seek injunctions prohibiting infringement before the patent's 
expiration); and 
(2) a court would only award these damages with some probability 
less than one. 
A probabilistic patent incorporates both imperfect enforcement 
and delay, because a patent holder cannot learn whether infringing 
producers will have to pay damages until the patent has expired, 
and this delayed decision is itself somewhat random. Thus, the 
19. In terms of Figure 1, infringement might not only drive the price to P', but the paten­
tee would be supplying only a portion of Q'. 
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model imagines a regime in which the patentee of a true innovation 
- that is, an innovation deserving immediate and certain enforce­
ment under current law20 - would have to wait until the day the 
patent expired to learn if a court would award damages for any past 
infringement; and the court would make this determination simply 
by flipping a weighted coin with, say, only an 80% chance of en­
forcement. If the coin lands on "enforce," the court would force 
infringers to "make the patentee whole" by increasing the paten­
tee's profits to the monopoly level (what the patentee's profits 
would have been without infringement); if the coin lands on "don't 
enforce," infringers would not have to pay any damages.21 
This model is intentionally reductive to illuminate how uncer­
tainty and delay can produce higher welfare than an "idealized" 
patent regime, which provides immediate and certain resolution of 
validity disputes. While the thesis of this Article is not that judges 
should actually flip weighted coins in adjudication, understanding 
the perverse benefits of uncertainty and delay suggests that policy­
makers may not want to spend inordinate amounts of money to 
eliminate certain types of uncertainty and delay from the current 
system. 
To show how uncertainty and delay in resolving patent disputes 
can perversely enhance welfare, consider the following algebraic 
model. Assume that a patent is awarded for a product that has a 
simple linear demand: 
where p =price; and 
p = 100 - q (1) 
q = the total quantity sold per period. 
Also assume constant marginal costs of production - which 
without loss of generality can be set equal to zero.22 If the legal 
system affords the patentee the certain right to immediately enjoin 
20. Thus our model only admits the possibility of Type I uncertainty (the possibility that 
valid patents will be unenforced) excluding the possibility of Type II uncertainty (the possi­
bility that invalid patents might be enforced). We will later discuss the extent to which uncer­
tainty in the real world gives rise to each of these two distinct possibilities. See infra Part III. 
For now, suffice it to say that we could imagine a regime that keeps the amount of Type II 
uncertainty constant but which increases Type I uncertainty. For example, one could imagine 
a regime in which a court or an agency immediately adjudicated the validity of the patent but 
then waited 20 years before flipping a coin to decide whether any damages would be paid for 
intervening infringement. 
21. In either instance, the result of the coin flip should not affect future behavior, because 
the validity of the patent is only determined after the patent has expired. 
22. If the product costs $10 per unit to produce, the demand schedule could simply be 
rescaled to produce the same results. 
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infringement,23 then the patentee will maximize its profits by pro­
ducing the monopoly output of fifty each period, and would earn a 
profit of $2,500 during each period that the patent was enforced. 
For simplicity, let's begin by assuming that the patent is valid for 
just one period.24 
Now consider what would happen under a probabilistic patent 
regime in which the court did not decide whether to enforce a pat­
ent - in the limited sense of awarding damages for past infringe­
ment - until the end of the patent's life. Let w equal the crucial 
probability that a patentee will "win" a subsequent infringement 
suit to enforce the patent. Because the enforcement of the patent 
will only be resolved at the end of the patent's life, the legal rules 
must specify the ex post damages for interim (and potentially in­
fringing) production by other entrants. The following assumption is 
made about these ex post damages: 
If the court decides (with probability 1 - w) not to enforce the patent, 
the entrants producing before the court's decision owe no damages 
for infringement. But if the court decides (with probability w) to en­
force the patent, then infringing producers must pay their pro-rata 
share of the damages that would be sufficient to make the patentee 
whole.25 
For the linear dema.nd assumed in equation (1), the total damages 
would need to be sufficient to raise patentee profits to the monop­
oly level of $2,500 that she would have earned without infringe-
23. Stiff damages or strong injunctive protection of a patent entitlement would constitute 
what Calabresi and Melamed have called a "property rule. " See Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View oftlte Catlte­
dra� 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972). Recently, Robert Merges has written several 
pieces exploring the implications of property and liability rules in intellectual property. See, 
e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rigltts and Col­
lective Rigltts Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996); Robert P. Merges, Of Property 
Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 CowM. L. REv. 2655 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, 
Of Property Rules]. 
24. It is straightforward to allow patents to last for multiple periods (and to discount 
future profits) - or to define a period as lasting for 20 years. 
25. We further assume that infringing producers {possibly with the aid of litigation bonds) 
will be able to pay these damages, that is, they will not be able to evade their liability through 
bankruptcy, etc. 
Instead of being liable pro-rata, one might imagine that infringers would only be held 
liable for the marginal impact of their infringement on the patentee's damages. Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has rejected this standard: 
[T]here is the question whether [the defendant] is entitled to "credit," as it were, for the 
price erosion caused by the other infringers' sales . . . .  [T]he answer is no . . . .  A judge 
would not let the infringers play a game of whipsaw, in which each argued that it should 
pay less of the damages than its share of the sales, because the price would have been 
depressed anyway even had it never infringed. That approach would lead to a less than 
compensatory award. Indeed it might lead to no damages at all, even though by hypoth­
esis the patent holder and his licensee have been injured. 
In re Malturkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catlteter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1392 
(N.D. Ill. 1993). 
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ment. Thus, the damages of the ith entrant (conditional on the 
court ultimately deciding to enforce the patent) are assumed to be: 
i 
( !l!_) [$2,500 - qp (100 - q)] (2) Qe 
where q� = the quantity produced by the ith entrant; 
Qe = the quantity produced by all entrants; and 
qp = the quantity produced by the incumbent patentee. 
The model assumes that an arbitrarily large, competitive fringe of 
risk-neutral potential entrants is able and willing to enter and 
expand production if entry is profitable. It also assumes that the 
patentee is risk-neutral, and that if there is interim entry and 
production by nonpatented entrants, the patentee and the 
infringing entrants will strategically choose the quantity to produce 
- according to what in the literature is called a Coumot game.26 
With these assumptions it is possible to derive the equilibrium 
outputs of both the entrants (Qe) and the patentee (qp) expressed 
solely as a function of the probability (w) that the court will enforce 
the patent:27 
and 
Qe = (2 - 2w) 100 (3) 
(2-w) 
(4) 
26. In Cournot models of oligopolistic competition, each competitor chooses a quantity 
to produce that maximizes its profits, given an equilibrium expectation about the output of 
other producers. w is assumed to be common knowledge. The order of play is: (1) the 
patent is awarded; (2) the patentee and competitive fringe simultaneously choose output 
levels; and (3) the court flips a coin and announces damages if the patent is to be "enforced." 
The possibility of risk-averse patentees is discussed supra note 9. 
27. Given the entrants' expectation about the patentee's quantity (qp), the competitive 
fringe will entel' and increase its output until the entrants' profits are equal to the entrants' 
expected damages from losing an infringement suit. Algebraically, this equality can be 
expressed as: , 
Q. (100 - q) = w [�2,500 - qp (100 - q)] 
Given the patentee's expectation about the quantity that the competitive fringe will produce 
(Q,), the patentee will produce the quantity that maximizes its profits. Since its profits are 
w[$2,500] + (1 - w) [qp (100 - q)] (and remembering that q = qp + Q,), a profit maximizing 
patentee will produce: 
100- Q. qp 
= 2 
Solving these two equations yields the expressions for the patentee's and entrants' output 
shown in the text. 
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This example shows how probabilistic patents induce limited 
amounts of infringement. The output of entrants increases with 
uncertainty (that is, as the probability of enforcement, w, 
decreases). And the increase in the entrants' output more than 
offsets the decrease in the incumbent's output - so that total 
industry output q = (Qe + qp) increases as well. But increased 
uncertainty does not induce unlimited entry because competition 
drives down the market price toward marginal cost, eventually 
reducing the benefits of supra-competitive pricing below the 
expected cost of paying pro-rata make-whole damages. 
TABLE 1: EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON PATENTEE'S PROFITS 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Probability of Expected % of % of Ratio of 
Enforcement Patentee Monopoly Monopoly % S.C. to 
w Price Profits Social Cost Profit Social Cost % Profit 
100% 50.0 2500.0 1250.0 100.00% 100.00% 1.00 
95% 45.2 2477.3 1023.2 99.09% 81.86% 0.83 
90% 40.9 2417.4 836.8 96.69% 66.94% 0.69 
85% 37.0 2329.9 682.9 93.19% 54.63% 0.59 
80% 33.3 2222.2 555.6 88.89% 44.44% 0.50 
75% 30.0 2100.0 450.0 84.00% 36.00% 0.43 
70% 26.9 1967.5 362.4 78.70% 28.99% 0.37 
65% 24.1 1827.8 289.8 73.11% 23.18% 0.32 
60% 21.4 1683.7 229.6 67.35% 18.37% 0.27 
55% 19.0 1536.9 179.8 61.47% 14.39% 0.23 
50% 16.7 1388.9 138.9 55.56% 11.11% 0.20 
45% 14.5 1240.9 105.4 49.64% 8.43% 0.17 
40% 12.5 1093.8 78.1 43.75% 6.25% 0.14 
35% 10.6 948.1 56.2 37.92% 4.50% 0.12 
30% 8.8 804.5 38.9 32.18% 3.11% 0.10 
25% 7.1 663.3 25.5 26.53% 2.04% 0.08 
20% 5.6 524.7 15.4 20.99% 1.23% 0.06 
15% 4.1 389.0 8.2 15.56% 0.66% 0.04 
10% 2.6 256.2 3.5 10.25% 0.28% 0.03 
5% 1.3 126.6 0.8 5.06% 0.07% 0.01 
0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00% 0.00% 
Table 1 shows the equilibrium price and the patentee's expected 
profits for various levels of enforcement uncertainty. For example, 
if w equals 75%, equations (3) and (4) predict that the patentee 
would produce 30 units (20 down from its monopoly output of 50) 
and that entrants would produce 40 units. The expanded industry 
production drives the market price down from the monopoly price 
of $50 to $30.zs 
28. In this model, the fact that the market price (in dollars) equals the patentee's output 
(in units) is an artifact of the particular linear demand function and not a general result. 
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As is well known, reducing the market price reduces the 
deadweight loss of monopoly. In this example, the reduction in 
social cost is significant: infringement eliminates almost two-thirds 
( 64 % ) of the dead weight loss of monopoly pricing (down $800 from 
$1,250 to $450).29 But the patentee's expected profits are reduced 
by less than one-sixth from the monopoly level.30 In this example, 
the patentee expects to earn a total of $2,100: $900 on the units she 
produces ($30 per unit on 30 units) and $1,200 in damages (a 75% 
chance of $1,600). A crucial aspect of the competitive fringe 
assumption is that the profits from infringing production are on 
average all expected to go to the patentee.31 
Uncertainty and delay are both necessary to induce limited 
amounts of interim infringement (and their salutary effects on the 
patentee's pricing). Delay is necessary, because a regime that 
immediately resolved any uncertainty about a patent's validity 
would recreate the all-or-nothing excess of the idealized regime.32 
Patentees would immediately learn whether or not they had 
complete monopoly power - so that with probability w the 
patentee would enjoin all interim infringement and set the full 
monopoly price. Uncertainty is necessary, because a regime that 
produced delayed, but certain, decisions (therefore refusing 
injunctions and only awarding damages ex post with probability w = 
1), would also deter all interim infringement. Potential infringers 
would know that infringement would inevitably expand industry 
output above the monopoly level and thus .reduce total industry 
profit. Accordingly, they would know that any profits they would 
earn from infringement in the interim would be insufficient to 
compensate the patentee for lost profits. • Potential infringers, 
knowing that they could not break even, would not infringe. 
29. This reduction in the deadweight-loss triangle is represented in Figure 1. At the 
monopoly price the deadweight loss equals the area of the triangle comprising Areas B + C + 
D, but the reduction in price reduces the deadweight loss triangle to Area D. 
30. As shown in Table 1, profits fall $400 from $2,500 to $2,100. 
31. The competitive fringe earns profits of $1,200 ($30 per unit on 40 units) but 75% of 
the time must pay damages of $1,600 - so that competition induces entry to the point that 
entrants expect to earn zero profits. On net, the entrants' 25% chance of earning $1,200 
compensates for the 75% chance of losing $400. 
32. Delay would not be necessary to induce limited infringement if (1) damages were not 
set to compensate the patentee for lost monopoly profits, and (2) prospective damages were 
possible instead of an injunction. Under such circumstances, the partially compensating 
damages would be equivalent to a compulsory license. See infra text accompanying notes 
115-27. 
Even though delayed judgement is needed to induce interim infringement, the law may 
not need to mandate delayed decision. As long as the patentee has the option of postponing 
judgement, the patent holder has a strong incentive to delay the court's decision. See infra 
text accompanying notes 66-67. 
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:985 
Table 1 shows that introducing small amounts of uncertainty 
reduces deadweight loss much more than it reduces the patentee's 
expected profit. By itself this observation is not a very powerful 
guide to policy because it does not tell us whether the benefit of 
lower prices is worth the cost of reduced innovation incentives. The 
next sections apply the stationarity and Ramsey pricing intuitions to 
the model to show why, with either fixed or enlarged patent 
durations, concerns about innovation need not undermine the 
usefulness of probabilistic patents. 
A. Introducing Uncertainty Without Changing the Patent's 
Duration 
The essence of the stationarity intuition is illustrated in the 
second-to-top row of Table 1. If the probability of enforcement w is 
95%, the market price will be cut nearly 10% (from $50 to $45.20) 
and the social cost of the patent will fall more than 18%.33 But near 
the point where the profit function is maximized - the point where 
profits are stationary - small changes in price have a negligible 
effect on profit. As shown in Table 1, this rather significant de­
crease in deadweight loss occasions less than a 1 % drop in profits.34 
While the stationarity intuition holds as a matter of theory only 
for arbitrarily small perturbations in price or quantity,35 the intui­
tion can hold as a practical matter for noninfinitesimal price reduc­
tions. Table 1, for example, shows that deadweight loss is much 
more sensitive than profits even for noninfinitesimal reductions in 
price. Moreover, this· result holds for a wide variety of demand and 
cost curves. The example that we can eliminate 19% of the dead­
weight cost of patents while only reducing the patentee's expected 
profit by 1 % suggests that policymakers should be willing to coun­
tenance small amounts of delay and uncertainty even without com­
pensating eXtensions of the patent life. For it seems likely that 
society would be better off bearing the reduction in innovation 
caused by a 1 % reduction in a patentee's expected profit, rather 
than bearihg the additional deadweight loss caused by monopoly 
33. Table 1 shows the social cost of $1,023.20 to be 81.86% of the monopoly social cost 
($1,250). 
34. Table 1 shows profits of $2,477.30 to be 99.09% of monopoly profits ($2,500). 
35. As George Akerlof and Janet Yellen have noted with regard to the stationarity pre­
requisite for the envelope theorem: "[F)or the [envelope] theorem to have practical rele­
vance, it must be true for finite values of w, corresponding to economically noticeable shocks, 
and not just for infinitesimal w • • • •  " Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 6, at 711. 
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pricing.36 Introducing discrete amounts of uncompensated uncer­
tainty might reduce welfare if innovations were relatively sensitive 
to small reductions in price: It would be possible to construct path­
ological examples in which innovations were discontinuous in the 
patentee's profits so that even a 1 % reduction in expected profit 
would be sufficient to deter innovation. But our patent law is not 
tailored to induce efficient innovation on a case-by-case basis -
such tailoring would be prohibitively expensive. In our one-size­
fits-all twenty-year regime, it is much more natural to model the 
responsiveness of innovation to changes in profit as a continuous 
function. 
' 
Thus, the stationarity intuition suggests that even if patent 
length is held constant, some small but discrete amounts of delay 
and uncertainty might be cost-justified. The Ramsey pricing intui­
tion goes one step further, demonstrating that more substantial 
drops in patentee profits caused by uncertainty and delay - and 
the innovation reduction that those drops entail - can be offset by 
extending patent life. The next subsection shows how policymakers 
might extend patent life to hold the patentee's expected profits con­
stant under a probabilistic regime.37 




For sufficiently large reductions in price, the stationarity intui-
tion no longer holds true. Uncompensated decreases in expected 
profits might retard innovative effort enough to more than offset 
the benefits of reduced deadweight loss. But the range of cost­
justified uncertainty can be extended by increasing the duration of 
the patent's life. Lengthening the duration of the patent's validity 
can enhance the patentee's expected profits a.Ila thereby offset the 
innovation effects of uncertainty.38 . This section calculates how 
much longer the patents would need to remain (probabilistically) 
valid to maintain a patentee's expected profitability. Lengthening 
the patent's validity to maintain the patentee's expected profits 
36. See Tandon, supra note 2, at 474. The elasticity of sociaf surplus with regard to R&D 
has been estimated to be approximately 0.10. See id. A mild reduction in profit would occa­
sion a mild reduction in R&D and a correspondingly small reduction in value added from 
patents. · 
37. Obviously, such a lengthening analysis only has practical usefulness to the extent that 
statutory inertia can be overcome to actually increase the current patent duration. See 
Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1841. 
38. To be more precise, in a probabilistic regime, lengthening the patent's duration is only 
lengthening the patent's potential validity, because after the patent expires a court may hold 
(with probability 1 - w) that the patent was not valid. 
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eliminates the concern that probabilistic patents will retard initial 
innovation; patentees' incentives to innovate should be unaffected 
by a move toward a more uncertain, but longer-lived patent.39 
By holding the patentee's innovation incentive constant, we can 
focus on whether longer-lived probabilistic patents enhance con­
sumer surplus. It turns out that in the simple model (with constant 
annual demand) consumers are better off paying oligopolistic prices 
for an extended duration than paying monopoly prices for twenty 
years. To see why this is so in a world without discounting, look 
again at Table 1. If there is a 10% chance that the patent will not be 
enforced (w = 90%), then the resulting infringement will reduce 
profits per period to about 96.7% of what they would have been 
with certain enforcement. To maintain the patentee's expected 
profits, it would be necessary to lengthen the patent's duration to 
approximately 103.4% (1/.967) of its initial length. 
But Table 1 also indicates that a 90% probabilistic regime 
reduces the per period deadweight loss of the patent to approxi­
mately 67% of what it would be in the idealized regime. Social wel­
fare would be enhanced by increasing the patent length to 
compensate for the reduction in periodic profits because bearing 
67% of the deadweight loss per period for a duration that is 3.4 % 
longer reduces the total deadweight loss from monopoly to 69.2% 
( 67% times 103.4 % ) of what it would be under an idealized regime. 
The incentives for innovation are unaffected because the patentee 
receives the same expected return, but the social inefficiency of 
supra-competitive pricing is reduced by more than 30%. The right­
hand column of Table 1 - depicting the "Ratio of % Social Costs 
to % Profits" - thus shows what percentage of monopoly social 
costs would remain in a probabilistic patent regime that lengthened 
the patent's duration sufficiently to keep the expected profits 
constant.40 
This analysis resonates with Louis Kaplow's proposed standard 
for judging whether compensating increases in patent duration im­
proved social welfare: "[O]ne determines whether permitting the 
practice would impose more cost per unit of incremental reward 
than would result from lengthening the patent life to provide the 
39. Recall that we have assumed that patentees are risk-neutral. See supra note 9. 
40. The values for this column are calculated as follows: Generalizing from the example 
provided in the text, the optimal probabilistic regime requires multiplying the patent length 
by the inverse percentage of monopoly profit produced each period by the probabilistic re­
gime. The overall percentage effect on social welfare will thus be the periodic effect on social 
cost ("% S.C.") multiplied by the percentage increase in the length of the patent (1/"% 
Profit"), which equals the right-hand column. 
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same reward."41 In essence, policymakers should seek the lowest 
cost way of generating a particular level of profit. If raising the 
periodic price produces a higher social cost per dollars of profit 
than extending the life of the patent, then it is more efficient to 
extend the duration. Applying this standard to the example in 
which w equals 90%, we see that allowing the patentee to increase 
the market price from $41 to $50 (the monopoly level) produces 
approximately $5 of social cost for every dollar of profit generated 
for the patentee.4 2 But, in sharp contrast, "lengthening the patent 
life to provide the same reward" produces only 35 cents of social 
cost for every dollar of patentee profit generated.43 Thus, Kaplow's 
standard correctly captures the enhanced efficiency of a probabilis­
tic patent regime in which the patent duration is lengthened to keep 
the patentee's expected profits constant.44 
This simple example shows that consumers and the patentee 
might want to enter into a Coasean bargain to alter the idealized 
regime. In this bargain, the consumers would extend the patent du­
ration in exchange for the patentee reducing its price below the mo­
nopoly level.45 A reduction in price enhances periodic consumer 
welfare so much more than it reduces patentee profits, that increas­
ing the patent length can compensate the patentee for reduced in­
terim pricing and still leave extra surplus for consumers. This result 
holds not just for linear demand, but for any demand curve that is 
not overly convex - including all concave and constant elasticity 
curves. For such demand curves, the social cost per dollar of paten­
tee profit generated decreases as the price is constrained further 
below the monopoly level.46 
41. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1829. 
42. This calculation is based on $413.20 increased deadweight loss divided by $82.60 in­
creased patentee profit. 
43. For w = 90%, a compensating increase in patent duration increases the social cost by 
approximately $28 ( = ($837/.9669) - $837). The social cost per dollar of profit is calculated 
by dividing the $28 increased deadweight loss by the $82.60 increased patentee profit. 
44. For other examples of adjusting the patent length to keep the patentee's expected 
profits constant, see Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 2; Klemperer, supra note 2, at 114; and 
Manfredi La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. EcoN. REv. 1427, 1435-
37 (1989). 
45. In essence, the consumers would be exchanging their entitlement to end the patent's 
validity (for a few years) for the patentee's entitlement to price at the monopoly level. This 
example suggests that a monopsonist consumer might have a strong incentive to enter into a 
contract with a longer duration than the patent is valid for in exchange for a lower price per 
period. The fact that buyers with market power engage in a particular activity can provide 
strong information for policy makers seeking to promote the welfare of more diffuse con­
sumer groups. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony 
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REv. 13 (1992). 
46. See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 120-24. This is always true at sufficiently competitive 
prices, because (by stationarity) small increases in price affect patentee profits much more 
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This suggests that the probabilistic patent result might apply not 
only to many demand curves but also to many increments along a 
given demand curve. The intuition behind broad-based Ramsey 
taxing is that consumers will want to trade reduced pricing for a 
compensating increase in length under a broad array of demand 
conditions. Thus, the efficiency of restricting patentees' pricing ap­
plies not only to "local" reductions away from the monopoly price, 
but also to more substantial restrictions in the patentee's market 
power. Indeed, inspecting Table 1, one finds that continually lower­
ing the probability of enforcement increases social welfare - even 
after the patent length is increased to keep the patentee's expected 
profits constant. This can be seen by inspecting the falling percent­
ages in the far right-hand column. As described above, the ratio in 
this column shows the percentage of monopoly social cost that 
would remain in a probabilistic patent regime in which the patent's 
duration was increased to keep patentees' expected profits con­
stant.47 For example, if courts only enforced patents half of the 
time (w = 50%), there would be substantial amounts of infringe­
ment and the patentee's expected profit per period would only be 
519 (55.56%) of what it would be if the patentee could charge the 
monopoly price. To keep the patentee's expected profits constant, 
the patent duration would need to be lengthened by 80% (that is, 
multiplied by 9/5). But Table 1 also shows that the deadweight loss 
per period in this equilibrium is just 1/9 (11.11 % ) of what it would 
be if the patentee charged the monopoly price. Once again, the 
ratio in the right-hand column shows the combined effect of an in­
creased patent length and lower prices on the total deadweight loss: 
bearing just 1/9 of the periodic inefficiency for 9/5 periods produces 
a total inefficiency that is only 115 (that is, 20% as shown in Table 1) 
of the deadweight loss of the idealized monopoly regime. 
than they affect sociaJ welfare. But it is also true at all prices if the elasticity of demand is 
nondecreasing, since a firm selling at a higher elasticity earns lower profits relative to the 
consumer surplus dissipated. 
47. As a formal matter, policymakers would want to continue to reduce price (and 
lengthen the patent's duration) as long as: 
a[�] -- > 0, 
ilp 
where SC and lT are the expected periodic social cost and patentee profit, respectively. For 
the linear model set out above, this relevant derivative is always positive, indicating that 
compensated reductions in price all the way down to the competitive level are cost justified. 
This derivative will be positive for all levels of w for all demand curves that are not too 
convex. 
February 1999] Probabilistic Patents 1005 
The dominance of increasingly uncertain enforcement at all 
points along a demand curve that is not too convex heightens the 
perversity of the result, because without more it suggests that soci­
ety would be best served if patents lasted an arbitrarily long time, 
but the law granted damages for infringement after the fact with an 
arbitrarily small probability. This result by itself proves too much, 
because it does not contain a limiting principle. 
There are, however, two factors that limit the ability of 
lawmakers to lengthen the patent duration to compensate the pat.,. 
ent holder for lower profits per period. First, the discounting of 
future profits limits the ability of lawmakers to sufficiently lengthen 
the duration in order to hold the present value of the patent 
holder's profits constant. A probabilistic regime still reduces the 
present value of the social inefficiency, but discounting forces 
lawmakers to add an increasing number of years to the patent's du­
ration to keep the present value of the patentee's profits constant. 
TABLE 2: COMPENSATING INCREASE IN PATENT DURATION AND 
NET EFFECT ON EFFICIENCY (ASSUMING THE REAL DISCOUNT 
RATE IS 7% AND STATUS QUO DURATION OP- 20 YEARS) 
Percentage of 
Probability Number Present Value of Present Value Status Quo 
w of Years Price Patentee Profits of Social Cost Social Cost 
100.00% 20.0 $50.00 $26,907.25 $13,453.63 100.0% 
95.00% 20.4 $45.24 $26,907.25 $11,113.86 82.6% 
90.00% 21.6 $40.91 $26,907.25 $ 9,314.05 69.2% 
85.00% 23.6 $36.96 $26,907.25 $ 7,886.61 58.6% 
80.00% 26.9 $33.33 $26,907.25 $ 6,726.81 50.0% 
75.00% 32.5 $30.00 $26,907.25 $ 5,765.84 42.9% 
70.00% 45.1 $26.92 $26,907.25 $ 4,956.60 36.8% 
66.97% $25.17 $26,907.25 $ 4,525.50 33.60% 
Table 2 shows the number of years by which it wbuld be necessary 
to increase an idealized 20-year monopoly regime if the annual real 
discount rate is 7%.48 Without discounting, Table 1 suggests that to 
48. The total patent duration, L, required can be derived by setting the present value of 
receiving monopoly profits (rr'1) for 20 years equal to the present value of receiving con­
stricted profits (n(w )) for L years: 
-if'I (1 - (1 + Bt20) 
= 
n(w) (1 - (1 + l)tL) Ii (l+Bt1 Ii (l+Bt1 
which can be solved for L in terms of w and the other structural parameters in the model: 
-if'I 
-log [1 - n(w) (1 - (1 + Bt20)] 
L = ----------
log(l+li) 
The present value of social cost is simply the social cost from Table 1 discounted for L years. 
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compensate for a probabilistic regime in which w equals 70%, 
patent length would need to be increased approximately 27% 
( = (1/.787) - 1). Using a 20-year benchmark, this would mean an 
increase to approximately 25.4 years. But with 7% discounting, it 
would be necessary to increase the patent's length to more than 45 
years. Indeed, because a perpetuity has finite present value, even 
making the patent's validity perpetual would not compensate for 
sufficiently large decreases in the patent holder's profits per period. 
In the current example (with the model's linear demand and a 7% 
discount rate), compensating increases in patent duration are not 
possible if the probability of enforcement, w, is set below 67%. 
Second, the threat of preemptive innovation may also limit the 
ability of lawmakers to compensate lower periodic profits with 
longer patent validity. If technological advances are likely to make 
any particular invention outmoded after a small number of years, 
then extending the patentees' rights may not increase their ex­
pected return. Preemptive innovation would radically reduce the 
demand for the product in future periods. Because the discount 
rate can also be interpreted as the probability that the patent will 
become obsolete,49 it is possible to account for this technological 
limit by increasing the discount rate. For example, if the risk of 
technological obsolescence made a 10% discount rate more appro­
priate, then it would be impossible to support enforcement levels of 
less than 73%.50 
Another way to approach the practical impact of extending pat­
ent duration is to consider how much of a price reduction a given 
increase in patent duration could support. As a heuristic exercise, 
we consider an extremely stylized analysis of piroxicam, a popular 
antiarthritic drug that, until the patent expired in April 1992, was 
manufactured exclusively by Pfizer under the patent brandname 
"Feldene." In the year prior to the patent's expiration, Pfizer sold 
approximately 1.4 million units (100 20-mg. tablets) at $219 per 
49. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self Enforcing Co/111· 
sion, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 295, 315 (1987). 
SO. This lower limit on enforcement levels is calculated by determining what fall in peri­
odic profitability could not be compensated for by making the patent duration perpetual. Of 
course, a "perpetual probabilistic" patent as a limiting case would be impossible to imple­
ment because the court's decision whether to award damages for "interim" infringement 
would only come at the end of time. But a similar perpetual effect might be implemented 
with our "partial damages" regime, discussed infra section IV.B. Perpetual patents would 
violate the Constitution which gives Congress the power to reward exclusive rights for only a 
"limited" duration. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
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unit.51 But after the patent expired, generic manufacturers soon cut 
the price to $144 per unit.52 If we assume that (1) the generic price 
equals the constant marginal cost; (2) the patented price represents 
the monopoly price; (3) the periodic demand for Feldene is linear 
and constant across periods; and ( 4) patentee profit equals zero af­
ter the patent expires,53 then it is straightforward to assess the effect 
of trading longer duration for lower prices so as to keep the paten­
tee's profits constant. 
TABLE 3: HEURISTIC EFFECTS ON SOCIAL COST OF 
LENGTHENING FELDENE PATENT DURATION 
(BEYOND HYPOTHETICAL 20-YEAR PERIOD) 
(USING A 7 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE) 
Additional Years 
Reduced Price Which 
Keeps Patentee's 
Profit Constant 
Gross Reduction in 
Present Value 
Monopoly Social Cost 
($ millions) 
Percentage Reduction 
in Present Value of 













Table 3 shows that even modest increases in patent length can allow 
sufficient price reductions to substantially reduce . the deadweight 
loss of monopoly. While this stylized example abstracts away from 
many important aspects of reality, the exercise underscores in a real 
world setting that nontrivial improvements in efficiency may flow 
from a regime that trades longer duration for reduced market 
power. 
C. The Government Has Sufficient Information to Implement 
Probabilistic Patents 
All problems of patent regulation ultimately devolve to a ques­
tion of government information. If government had good informa­
tion about the cost and/or consumer value of a particular 
51. See James Kim, Drug-company backlash, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 1992, at Bl; conversa­
tion with Pfizer representative Roberta Lombardini (Nov. 3, 1995). 
52. Conversation with Pfizer representative, Roberta Lombardini (Nov. 3, 1995). 
53. Each of these assumptions is literally false. The periodic demand curves for patented 
products do not remain constant. And usually after a pharmaceutical patent expires, the 
patentee - when faced with generic competition - raises its price in order to focus on the 
relatively price insensitive segment of demand. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., Pharmaceuti­
cal Innovations and Market Dynamics: Tracking Effects on Price Indexes for Antidepressant 
Drugs, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 133, 151-52 
(Martin Neil Baily et al. eds., 1996); cf. Zvi Griliches & Iain Cockburn, Generics and New 
Goods in Pharmaceutical Price Indexes, 84 AM. EcoN. REv. 1213, 1215 (1994) (stating that 
"the incumbent usually does not respond to entry by reducing its price"). 
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innovation, it could pay efficient lump-sum bounties to the inventor 
and be done with the ex post deadweight loss altogether. Indeed, 
the Ramsey broad-based tax intuition itself suggests that the ex post 
distortion would be minimized if the patentees were able to impose 
a small tax on every conceivable product sold. Such a scheme is 
analytically equivalent to a lump sum reward funded out of the gen­
eral fisc. The problem, of course, is that the government does not 
have sufficiently strong information to determine how to appropri­
ately reward innovation. 
The current patent system - which grants the patentee a mo­
nopoly for a limited number of years - is structured to minimize 
the government's information requirement. Specifically, the cur­
rent system economizes on the patentees' private information. The 
government doesn't need to estimate the cost or value of innova­
tion. Instead, the government allows the patentee to capture a 
rough and limited proxy of consumer value and then lets the poten­
tial innovator decide whether the benefits of innovation justify the 
costs.54 
The benefits of probabilistic patents could also be created by a 
compulsory license regime that directly restricted the price that the 
patentee could charge (possibly in exchange for a longer duration). 
But compulsory license regimes face the same government informa­
tional hurdles as regimes with lump-sum bounties. It is particularly 
difficult for the government to estimate the demand and cost curves 
ex ante and to choose a price that would represent a certain per­
centage reduction in the monopoly markup.ss And if the govern­
ment did know enough to set an efficient compulsory license ex 
post the invention but ex ante the production, then it could go fur­
ther and implement a first-best lump-sum reward. 
Our argument is that lawmakers can improve on the current re­
gime without knowing the exact shape of the demand and cost 
54. There is evidence, however, that the returns to the patentee under the current system 
may capture much less than the social value of the patent. See, e.g., Tunothy F. Bresnahan, 
Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in Financial Serv­
ices, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 742, 753 {1986); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for 
Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. EcoN. 1137, 1141 (1998); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social 
and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 221, 234 (1977). 
55. Compulsory license regimes have been notoriously vague about the standards used to 
set "reasonable" royalties. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFEcrs OF COMPULSORY 
PATENT LICENSING 44 (Center for the Study of Fm. Indus., N.Y. Univ. Monograph Series in 
Fm. and Econs. No. 1977-2, 1997). Most often, however, the license fees are set to yield a 
reasonable profit above cost - instead of offering some percentage of what monopoly profit 
would be. Section IV.B will show that the benefits of probabilistic patents could also be 
obtained from a regime that provided patentees with certain enforcement but only awarded a 
percentage of the current make-whole damages. 
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curves. We can retain a system that ties the patentees' reward to 
the amount that can be extracted from consumers without giving 
patentees absolute monopoly power. To implement a probabilistic 
modification to the current regime, the government only needs to 
know (1) how to trade-off patent c�rtainty for duration; and (2) the 
maximum uncertainty that can feasibly be offset with additional 
patent life. Theory suggests a simple answer to the first question, 
and empiricism is available to answer the second. 
Trading Off Certainty and Length. Even though lawmakers 
would need to know the shape of the demand and cost curves to 
calculate the increase in duration needed to compensate exactly for 
an increase in uncertainty (and the price reduction that it creates),56 
a workable alternative is for the government to increase the dura­
tion in inverse proportion to the decrease in certainty. Multiplying 
the duration by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement (1/ 
w) typically offers a good approximation of the exact increase 
needed to assure that the patentee's expected profits are at least as 
great as under an uncompensated monopoly regime. Thus, under 
this approximation, if the probability of enforcement were 50%, the 
patent duration would be increased to 200% (1/.5) of its current 
level. Indeed, this simple reciprocal formula provides not only a 
workable approximation of the exact compensating increase in du­
ration, but also guarantees patentees a slight increase in expected 
reward.57 In our foregoing model with w equal to 50%, this approx­
imation would actually increase the patentee's expected profits by 
11 % (from $2,500 to $2,777.80) but would decrease the social cost 
of the patent 77.8% {from $1,250 to $277.80).58 
The Minimum Certainty that is Potentially Offsettable. While 
making the duration increase inversely with uncertainty neatly 
solves the government's trade-off problem, policymakers would still 
56. The total patent duration necessary is the standard patent duration (20 years) times 
the reciprocal of the periodic percentage of monopoly profit, see, e.g., supra Table 1, which 
will generally tum on the particular shape of the demand and cost curves. See supra note 40. 
57. To see this, let L equal the proportionate increase in patent length needed to keep the 
patentee's expected profits at the monopoly level. With this compensating increase in dura­
tion, the patentee will expect to earn: 
np = L[qpp + w(� - qpp)] 
where 1Tp = the patentee's expected profit and � = the monopoly profit. If the government 
sets L = llw, this expression for the patentee's expected profits can be simplified to show that 
it is slightly greater than monopoly profits: 
1Tp = � + cl.. - 1) qpp > tr"'. 
58. Note, however, that demand and cost curves can be constructed such that this simple 
formula overcompensates the patentee to the extent that total social cost is increased. 
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need a limiting principle to decide how much of a periodic price 
reduction could be compensated for with an extended patent life. 
In a world with discounting and an increasing probability of techno­
logical obsolescence, lawmakers would need to estimate how many 
years the patent length would need to be extended to compensate 
for, say, a 90% probability of enforcement. But this calculation can 
be largely independent of estimates about the demand and supply 
conditions - thus easing the information requirement 
considerably. 
To workably calculate the maximum compensable reduction in 
certainty, the government needs chiefly to know the rate at which 
the value of a patent generally decays.59 And while the government 
assuredly does not have this knowledge for individual patents, esti­
mates of just such decay rates are available for distinct patent 
classes. For example, Mark Schankerman has recently estimated 
the patent value decay rate using evidence from decisions on 
whether to pay yearly European renewal fees. 60 The data suggest 
that there are sharp distinctions in the rate at which the value of 
different types of patents decay. The value of pharmaceutical and 
chemical patents tend to decay at a 3 % or 4 % rate, while the value 
of mechanical and electronic patents tend to decay more quickly, at 
rates ranging between 10% and 15%. These data suggest that prob­
abilistic patents are more likely to be useful for pharmaceutical and 
chemical innovations where there is a higher probability that the 
patent will still be valuable at the end of twenty years.61 
59. In a simple model, imagine that the government knew that the probability that a 
patent would become obsolete in a particular year was o (which as discussed above can be 
interpreted as taking into account both the time value of money and the probability of obso· 
lescence). To compensate for the reduction in certainty, the government would want to set 
the patent length so that the present value of the probabilistic patent was equal to the present 
value of the nonprobabilistic 20-year patent. Instead of setting the patent length equal to the 
simple reciprocal of w, in a world with discounting it is necessary to set the approximate 
patent length equal to: 
-log [1 - � (1 - (1 + ()t20)] 
• Lapprox = ---------
log{l+o) 
See supra note 48. As in supra note 57, it can be shown that this approximation produces 
slightly higher expected payoffs than does the monopoly regime. 
60. See Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology 
Field, 29 RAND J. EcoN. 77 (1998); see also Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates 
of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, 54 EcoNOMETRICA 755 (1986); Ariel Pakes 
& Mark Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolescence of Patents, Research Gestation Lags, and the 
Private Rate of Return to Research Resources, in R&D, PATENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 73 (Zvi 
Griliches ed., 1984). 
61. Schankerman, supra note 60, at 84. 
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The minimum sustainable level of certainty is a function of the 
decay rate. For example, in a simple model where demand for a 
patent is constant while the patent is nonobsolete, but where there 
is a 3 probability that the patent will become obsolete, it is possible 
to show that the minimum compensable level of certainty (wmin) is: 
wmin = 1 - (1 +otzo (5) 
This minimum w represents the degree of uncertainty that could be 
compensated by an infinite patent duration. If Ci equals 10%, the 
minimum compensable w would equal approximately 85.1 %.  The 
government could use its knowledge about Ci in this or a similar 
equation to estimate the lowest compensable amount of certainty. 
Alternatively, if as a pragmatic or political matter the policymaker 
were limited to a patent duration of L max years, then the minimum 
compensable level of certainty (wmin) that would guarantee the pat­
entee no reduction in the present value of expected profit would be: 
w"'in = 1 - (1 + C>t20 (6)62 
1 - (1 + otLmax 
The amount of uncertainty is simply a function of the patent decay 
rate (a variable that has been at least crudely estimated for different 
classes of patents) and the maximum practicable patent duration. 
A more complicated model could undoubtedly generate more com­
plicated expressions turning on more variables, but the important 
point is that a government policymaker with limited information 
might still be able to have some idea of how much uncertainty to 
permit in exchange for a particular increase in patent life. 
Indeed, the lawmaker might go further in harnessing the private 
information by giving the patentee the option of trading longer pat­
ent duration for less certainty. Under this regime of patentee 
choice, the patentee could opt for the current twenty-year protec­
tion with monopoly power or choose to extend the duration in re­
turn for a lower probability of enforcement. In essence the 
patentee would be given the choice of a schedule based on equation 
( 6) and would be asked to pick a patent length and corresponding 
probability of enforcement. Patentees who believed their patent 
were unlikely to have value after 20 years would be unlikely to opt 
for longer durations, but an innovator with a patent whose value 
was particularly long lived might prefer to trade a longer patent 
duration for a lower probability of enforcement and the limited in­
fringement that it is likely to engender. Even if only the innovators 
62. This equation can be derived by re-solving the equation in note 59 in terms of w. 
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with the most valuable patents choose longer durations, substantial 
efficiency gains might be made, because a small number of the most 
valuable patents are responsible for a disproportionate percentage 
of total patent value.63 Of course, patentees would choose strategi­
cally, and therefore the patentees' choice would not coincide with 
the social optimum. Indeed, in some examples the patentee would 
choose a probability of enforcement that even reduced social wel­
fare.64 For this reason, we ultimately favor the government choos­
ing the level of uncertainty based on the government estimate of 
the rates of decay, as discussed above. But for those who give para­
mount importance to maintaining innovative incentives, a probabil­
istic regime with patentee choice would assure that patentees' 
expected rewards would not be decreased, because patentees could 
always opt for the status quo protection. While we do not seriously 
propose giving patentees the option of trading off a lower certainty 
of enforcement for a longer patent duration, the principle could be 
applied to more practical policy issues.65 
D. Uncertainty Creates Delay 
Our plan requires delay and uncertainty, but uncertainty by it­
self can give both the patentee and the infringer incentives to delay 
a court's determination. The patent holder has a strong incentive to 
delay the court's decision because if (with probability w) the patent 
is enforced, the patentee earns identical profits whether or not 
there is delay - but if (with probability 1 - w) the patent is not 
enforced, the patentee earns much less profit from an immediate 
decision. If the court decides immediately that the patent will not 
be enforced, noninfringing entry could eliminate all of the patent 
holder's expected profits; but if the court delays its decision that the 
patent is not enforceable, then the patent holder earns oligopolistic 
profits from competing against more limited "infringement."66 
63. Schankerman estimates: "The top 1 % of patents account for 12% and 14% of the 
total value of patent rights in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, respectively, and 21 % and 24% 
for mechanical and electronics patents (excluding Japan)." Schankennan, supra note 60, at 
94. 
64. For example, if a patentee believes that a patent will not become marketable until 
more than 20 years in the future, she might pick a low w (say 50%) that creates more dead­
weight loss than society would experience under the current regime. 
65. For example, with regard to the Hatch-Waxman amendments, pharmaceutical paten­
tees might be allowed to trade off extended patent duration for weaker preliminary injunc­
tion rights. See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. 
66. However, if patent damages are not expected to make the patentee whole, the paten­
tee may prefer to have an immediate decision. See infra note 116. 
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The model also suggests that the nonpatent holders may not 
have a strong incentive to oppose delaying tactics of the patentee. 
If (as the simple model assumes) nonpatent holders form a compet­
itive fringe of potential supply, they should, before entering, be in­
different between immediate and delayed decision because they 
expect to earn zero profits in either case. If there are fixed costs of 
entry (or some other factor that might allow potential entrants to 
earn positive profits if the patent were held not valid), then these 
potential entrants might seek a declaratory judgement that the pat­
ent is not enforceable or might prefer delay, depending on the pre­
cise size of the fixed cost: immediate decision reduces the expected 
damages from infringement (because infringing production can be 
stopped), but also reduces the expected profits from noninfringe­
ment (because additional competitors will enter the market). If de­
lay necessarily increases the litigation costs, either the patentee or 
the nonpatent holder may prefer immediate decision; but absent 
significant litigation costs attributable to delay, it is possible that de­
lay will endogenously arise in a regime with uncertain enforcement 
- as patentees may have strong incentive to delay and the 
nonpatentees may not have a strong incentive to oppose such delay. 
Since many patent regimes already create substantial uncertainty 
about whether valid patents will be enforced, our model may help 
explain why infringement litigation takes so long to conclude.67 
II. CAVEATS 
This section explores a number of the most important reasons 
why the benefits of uncertainty and delay extolled in the foregoing 
model may not be achieved or might · be outweighed by additional 
costs. "Probabilistic" patents may induce larger costs if they exac­
erbate the expense of litigation, interfere with follow-on innovation, 
or if infringing firms pay excessive fixed costs. And the projected 
benefits attributed to uncertainty - in restraining patent holders 
from raising prices all the way to the monopoly level - may be 
overstated if independent forces restrain patent holders from set­
ting monopoly pnces, or if price discrimination independently 
reduces the distortionary effect of monopoly power. While this is 
not a complete list of caveats,68 it gives a flavor of some of the most 
67. A particularly notorious example of protracted litigation concerns an interference 
proceeding that was declared in 1958 and resolved by the District Court only in 1980. See 
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
CoLUM. L. REv. 839, 901-02 & n.292 (1990). 
68. For example, if the patentee is risk-averse, it would be necessary to have a longer 
compensating extension in duration to compensate for the risk that the patent would not be 
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important countervailing factors when considering uncertainty and 
delay in patent enforcement. 
A. Exacerbating Litigation Costs 
The simple model outlined above unrealistically excludes any 
costs of litigation. In the real world, infringement litigation carries 
with it significant costs. 69 It is commonly argued that uncertainty 
increases the cost of litigation. But this is not necessarily true. 
Rules that limit the resources spent on discovery or adjudication 
might increase uncertainty (because the decisionmaker would have 
poorer information) and simultaneously reduce litigation costs. For 
example, reforms that limit the amount of discovery and/or limit an 
infringement trial to two days at the end of the patent's life would 
probably lead to more uncertainty and lower litigation expense.70 
Some forms of uncertainty and delay would undoubtedly lead to 
litigation costs that swamp the benefits of limited interim infringe­
ment, but the point here is that legal policy could move toward pro­
cedural rules that increased or retained elements of uncertainty 
without enriching our siblings at the bar. 
B. Probabilistic Patents Might Hinder Follow-On Innovation 
The previous analysis might also understate the dynamic costs 
related to follow-on innovation.71 If a patent's life is lengthened 
under a probabilistic regime to keep the patent holder's expected 
profits constant, then this lengthening might further block the 
emergence of valuable follow-on invention. While this criticism 
may be valid, it must be weighed against the fact that a probabilistic 
regime will also facilitate limited amounts of interim infringement 
enforced. And while our model assumed that competition among potential infringers caused 
all the profits from infringement to on average be paid to the patentee by way of damages for 
infringement, one can construct models in which infringers earn profits in equilibrium (even 
after accounting for expected damages). Having infringers syphon off part of the industry's 
profits would also require larger compensating increases in duration. If either the risk­
aversion or the infringer-profit effects were sufficiently pronounced, a probabilistic regime 
would not enhance welfare. 
69. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORM· 
ANCE 454 (2d ed. 1980) (estimating total annual patent system administration and litigation 
costs to be roughly $300 million in 1978); Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competi­
tors, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 463, 470 (1995) ("[T]he patent litigation within USPTO and the federal 
courts begun in 1991 will lead to total legal expenditures (in 1991 dollars) of about $1 billion, 
a substantial amount relative to the $3.7 billion spent by U.S. firms on basic research in 
1991."); Leslie Scism, Insurance Helps Little Guy Sue Patent Infringer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 
1996, at Bl (observing that patent litigation can "cost hundreds of thousands of dollars "). 
70. We will return to the question of whether the law can induce the right type of uncer­
tainty, infra Part III. 
71. See Scotchmer, supra note 1. 
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- including potential infringement from follow-on inventors.7 2 It 
is accordingly possible that probabilistic regimes - like compulsory 
licensing regimes - might reduce the dynamic inefficiency of the 
idealized injunctive regime.73 
C. Infringers' High Costs May DiSsipate Probabilistic Benefits 
Our model assumed that the infringers' entry into the market 
was efficient. Competition among potential infringers caused them 
to be perfect agents for society. They mitigated the deadweight loss 
by competing down the monopoly price, and turned over their prof­
its (on average) to the patentee. If, however, there are fixed costs 
of entry or exit (or if entrants have higher marginal costs than the 
patentee), the infringers will also turn some of the patentee's profits 
into extra costs, which are a new kind of deadweight loss. In these 
cases, excessive entry may therefore increase social costs.74 
Nevertheless, when entrants' additional costs make free entry a 
social bad, a correctly chosen w (and a compensating increase in 
patent duration) can both reduce social cost during the original pat­
ent life and reduce it by excluding unwanted excess entry during the 
extended patent duration. For example, imagine in our foregoing 
model (without discounting) that the fixed costs per period are 100. 
Free entry implies that nine firms (including the patentee) will 
enter, creating combined deadweight loss and fixed costs of 950. 
With these fixed costs, however, it is socially optimal for only four 
firms to compete.75 Setting w equal to 3/7 and doubling the patent 
length to make the patentee whole produces the efficient amount of 
entry (three firms enter to challenge the incumbent patentee) and 
reduces social cost in both the initial patent period and the exten-
72. See infra text accompanying note 106 (discussing how broadening the doctrine of re· 
verse equivalence may facilitate follow.on innovation). 
73. Indeed, Professors Green and Scotchmer have shown that creating uncertainty about 
follow·on innovation may increase the expected returns of the initial patentee. See Green & 
Scotchmer, supra note 1. When it is certain that follow-on innovation will infringe, the 
follow-on innovators may credibly threaten not to invest in innovation (foreseeing that they 
will have to pay a large licensing fee). But Green and Scotchmer show that uncertainty about 
whether a subsequent innovation will be infringing may mitigate this threat of noninnovation 
and may thereby actually increase the original patentee's exp�cted profits. See id. at 27; see 
also Scotchmer, supra note 1; Chang, supra note 1. 
74. This is an example of the general proposition that with fixed costs (or if entrants have 
higher marginal costs), entry restrictions may be socially beneficial. See Jeremy I. Bulow et 
al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. POL. EcoN. 488, 
504·05 (1985); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Ineffi­
ciency, 17 RAND J. EcoN. 48 (1986). 
75. That is, the socially optimal number of firms is four, assuming the foregoing Coumot 
model as set out in equations (1) and (2). Obviously, an all-powerful and all-knowing regula­
tor could do better than permit Coumot competition. 
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sion period. Indeed, in this example, granting a perpetual patent 
(with w = 317) would increase the patentee's expected profits and 
reduce social cost by forever constraining the deadweight loss of 
excessive entry. Surprisingly, then, fixed costs do not generally mil­
itate against the use of probabilistic regimes. Fixed costs generally 
imply that the optimal amount of entry lies between monopoly and 
free entry levels. Probabilistic patents can be a means of inducing 
this intermediate level. Fixed costs reduce the benefits of con­
straining the monopoly price, but they simultaneously reduce the 
costs of extending the patent duration (because the extension con­
strains excessive entry in what would otherwise be an unpatented 
period). Since fixed_ costs reduce both the costs and the benefits of 
introducing uncertainty with compensating extensions in patent du­
ration, the presence of fixed costs do not clearly contraindicate the 
use of a probabilistic patent regime. (Of course, we must be more 
cautious about encouraging infringement if we cannot simultane­
ously extend patent lives). 
A similar analysis applies if infringers have higher marginal 
costs of production than the patentee: the benefits of infringement 
during the original patent period are reduced (or conceivably even 
reversed) but the costs of extending the patent life are likewise re­
duced (or possibly reversed). 
D. Existing Deadweight Losses May Not Be Severe 
If the patentee is able to perfectly price discriminate, then prob­
abilistic patents would not be able to reduce the deadweight loss of 
monopoly pricing (because perfect price discrimination does not 
create any deadweight loss to begin with). However, although pat­
entees as a legal matter are allowed to price discriminate, imperfect 
information about consumer valuations and an inability to stop re­
sale often prevents patentees from engaging in any more than very 
crude forms of price discrimination. So probabilistic patents might 
still usefully be used to increase output. 
The benefits of probabilistic patents may also be overstated if 
structural factors independently induce patent holders to charge 
less than the static monopoly price. For example, industrial organi­
zation theory suggests some such factors that might lead manufac­
turers with complete monopoly power to charge less than what 
otherwise would be the static profit-maximizing price, including: 
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producer learning curves, network externalities, and consumer 
switching costs.76 
However, factors such as these do not affect the stationarity in­
tuition that a small reduction from full monopoly power has only a 
small effect on a patentee's profits, but has a large impact on social 
welfare. The patentee will still choose a price (or quantity) that is 
profit maximizing, and while the price that maximizes profits in a 
more dynamic model may be below the profit-maximizing price in a 
simple, static model, it will still represent a stationary point on the 
patentee's profit function. These other factors also do not affect the 
Ramsey intuition that a regime of certain patents can be improved 
upon by probabilistic but longer-lived patents, though they may af­
fect the quantitative significance of our results.77 
Things are more complex if the patentee is engaged in oligo­
polistic competition with the producers of noninfringing differenti­
ated products. In this case, facilitating limited infringement may 
not only affect the overall output of the patented product, but may 
also affect the output of the noninfringing products. While profits 
stolen by the infringers are, in equilibrium, returned to the patentee 
as expected damages, any profits transferred from the patentee to 
the noninfringing producers will not be recouped by the patentee.78 
Under such circumstances, the stationarity intuition would accord­
ingly no longer hold.79 If limited infringement induces a significant 
76. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 69; Alan Beggs & Paul Klempe�er, Multi·period Com­
petition with Switching Costs, 60 EcoNOMETRICA 651 (1992); Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., Dy­
namic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat of Entry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 306 {1971); 
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75 
AM. EcoN. REv. 424 {1985); Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching 
Costs, 62 REv. EcoN. STUD. 515 {1995); Paul Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets 
with Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 138 (1987); Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in 
Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 97 EcoN. J. 99 (Supp. 1987); Paul Klemperer, Mar­
kets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. EcoN. 375 {1987); Paul Klemperer, Price Wars 
Caused by Switching Costs, 56 REv. EcoN. STUD. 405 {1989); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information, 50 EcoNOMETRICA 443 {1982); A. 
Michael Spence, The Leaming Curve and Competition, 12 BELL J. EcoN. 49 {1981). 
77. A caveat is that infringing entry may be quite inefficient in the presence of learning 
curves and perhaps also if there are network externalities or consumer switching costs, be­
cause entry is likely to raise production costs or consumers' costs. See articles cited supra 
note 76; Paul Klemperer, Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs, 37 J. 
INDus. EcoN. 159 (1988). But these are just special cases of'the issue discussed supra in 
section 11.C: from the social perspective these effects reduce the benefits of infringement and 
the costs of extending the patent life. 
78. Patentees have at times been successful in claiming infringement damages for their 
own lost sales of noninfringing products, but no court to date has awarded damages because 
infringement transferred sales from the patentee to other noninfringing products. See infra 
section IV.B {discussing frontiers of patent damage litigation). 
79. The stationarity intuition does not fail if the patentee must compete with a competi­
tive fringe of noninfringing products. For example, if the patentee of a differentiated (and 
perhaps slightly better) mouse trap must vie in the marketplace against a competitive market 
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increase in the production of the noninfringing substitutes (and con­
sequent reduction in the patentee's profit), then the patentee may 
be nontrivially harmed by the infringement. However, if limited 
infringement results in a decreased output of the noninfringing 
good,80 the patentee would not be harmed by a little infringement. 
Furthermore, even if infringement does induce increased nonin­
fringing output, the Ramsey intuition still typically applies: it is still 
likely to be socially preferred to allow a little infringement over a 
longer period (that is, award long-lived probabilistic patents) than 
to continue with the current regime of no infringement followed by 
free entry. Again, therefore, our results are only likely to be quan­
titatively rather than qualitatively affected. 
While structural factors may independently constrain the pricing 
of many electronic and mechanical patents that must compete in 
more fluid high-tech environments, there is some evidence that mo­
nopoly pricing is much more of a concern with regard to pharma­
ceutical products. For example, F.M. Scherer has noted: 
From 1956 through the mid-1960s, the Pfizer Company and its four 
licensees sold the antibiotic tetracycline to druggists at a wholesale 
price of $30.60 per bottle of 100 capsules. Total sales at wholesale to 
drug stores exceeded $1 billion during this period. Production costs 
ranged between $1.60 and $3.80 per bottle; and when doubts about 
the validity of Pfizer's patent began to mount, several unlicensed 
firms began producing and selling tetracycline at approximately $2.50 
per bottle wholesale. Many similar cases of price-cost margins on the 
order of 90 percent for patented drug products have been identified.81 
of noninfringing traps, the patentee is likely to face a very elastic demand curve. The profit­
maximizing price for this downward sloping, but relatively flat demand curve, is likely to be a 
much smaller percentage markup over the patentee's cost, but the logic of our main model 
still applies. 
80. This will usually be the case in quantity competition, as our model assumes (and is the 
case for the demand and cost conditions in our simple model). More generally, the patentee 
will not be harmed by a little infringement when competition is between strategic substitutes 
in the terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer. See Jeremy I. Bulow et al., 
Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry, 95 EcoN. J. 178 (1985); Bulow et al., supra note 74. In 
a price-competition model, however, strategic complements would be more likely. In that 
case, limited infringement might cause both the patentee and the noninfringing producers to 
lower their prices (and even perhaps increase their output) - so the patentee would be more 
likely to be significantly harmed by a small infringement. On the question of whether quan­
tity competition or price competition is the more natural assumption, see Paul Klemperer & 
Margaret Meyer, Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: The Role of Uncertainty, 17 
RAND J. EcoN. 618 (1986); Paul D. Klemperer & Margaret A. Meyer, Supply Function Equi­
libria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty, 57 EcoNOMETRICA 1243 (1989); and the articles cited 
therein. 
81. SCHERER, supra note 69, at 450 (citing Henry Steele, Monopoly and Competition in 
the Ethical Drugs Market, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 131 (1962); Henry Steele, Patent Restrictions and 
Price Competition in the Ethical Drugs Industry, 12 J. INous. EcoN. 198 (1964)). 
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Such huge price-costs margins, combined with evidence of substan­
tially lower prices offered by generic producers upon the expira­
tions of the original patents,82 suggests strongly that holders of 
pharmaceutical patents may be raising prices to points where the 
benefits of restricting market power are considerable. Certain 
types of uncertainty combined with delay might produce a net ben­
efit with regard to pharmaceutical (and possibly to a lesser extent 
chemical) patents. Furthermore, as discussed above, pharmaceuti­
cal patents are more likely to have value at the end of twenty years 
and hence give lawmakers an opportunity to increase the duration 
of potential profitability. For pharmaceutical products, then, in­
creasing patent duration while reducing certainty might maintain 
patentee expected profitability and thus maintain the incentive to 
innovate.83 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
This Article does not propose that courts flip coins after fifty 
years to decide whether patents should be enforced. Yet appreciat­
ing the benefits of uncertainty and delay can inform many questions 
of policy at the margin. In particular, the model suggests that it is 
important to distinguish between two types of uncertainty in patent 
enforcement. The possibility that valid patents will be unenforced 
(Type I uncertainty) is more likely to be efficient than the possibil­
ity that invalid patents will be enforced (Type II uncertainty). En­
forcing invalid patents creates ex post pricing distortions without 
enhancing innovation,84 while our model showed that failing to en-
82. The patentee's markup can often be estimated by looking at the price generic produ­
cers are willing to charge once the patent expires. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expira­
tion, Entry and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 36 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Wmston eds., 
1991) (finding that first generic entrant tends to charge 58.8% of patented price; with three 
generic entrants the generic price falls to 49.6% and with ten generic entrants the percentage 
falls to 29.4%); Battling the High Cost of Drugs, HARV. HEALTH LETIER (Harv. Med. Sch., 
Dept. of Continuing Educ.), July 1993, at 9 (noting that in Canada, generic manufacturers 
may copy patented drugs if they pay a royalty to the patent holder; the entry of the first 
generic competitor prompts an average price drop of 25-30%, and as others enter the price 
may drop up to 90%). There are, of course, other extreme examples. See, e.g., Moneyweek, 
(CNN television broadcast, May 21, 1994) (reporting that prices on Naprosyn (by Syntex) fell 
80% just 24 hours after the patent expired). 
83. Also, as large corporations with multiple R&D projects and low-cost access to finan­
cial markets, pharmaceutical enterprises should be systematically less risk averse than 
smaller, single project inventors. Accordingly, risk aversion in the pharmaceutical context is 
less likely to contraindicate intentional uncertainty. See supra note 9 (discussing risk 
aversion). 
84. This is especially true if courts enforce a patent that is not novel (whose idea is al­
ready embodied in the prior art). We note, however, that an optimal patent system might 
want to provide some lesser rewards for inventions that do not rise to the level of strict 
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force otherwise-valid patents could reduce the ex post distortions 
without reducing, or without substantially reducing, innovation in­
centives. This distinction suggests that policymakers should be 
more attuned to eliminating Type II uncertainty than Type I uncer­
tainty.ss The Type I uncertainty in the current system may not be as 
inefficient as previously thought - and reforms that move us to­
ward a more certain regime with ex ante injunctions may not be 
cost effective. 
A. Reducing the Use of Preliminary Injunctions 
Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
has made it easier for patent holders to secure preliminary injunc­
tions prohibiting competitors from producing potentially infringing 
products until the court has resolved the underlying dispute. 86 This 
strong prefer�nce for injunctive relief grows in part out of courts' 
essentialist view of patents as "property": "Patents must by law be 
given 'the attributes of personal property.' The right to exclude 
others is the essence of the human right called 'property.' "87 The 
courts' protection of patent qua property becomes an end in itself, 
trumping all other conceptions of the good. For example, in a pat­
ent dispute in which Polaroid successfully sought to enjoin Kodak's 
manufacture of instant cameras, the court opined: 
Kodak's characterization of the public interest . . .  misconstrues the 
very concept of public benefit. The public policy at issue in patent 
cases is the "protection of rights secured by valid patents." Courts 
grant - or refuse to stay - injunctions in order to safeguard that 
policy, even if those injunctions discommode business and the con­
suming public. 88 
patentability. Type II unce'rtainty might have the benefit of generating lower rewards for 
innovations that were, say, only quasi-novel. 
85. General discussions of structuring legal rules to achieve the appropriate balance of 
Type I and 'fype II error can be found in Krier, supra note 3; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. EcoN. & ORO. 99 
(1989); and Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: 
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 16 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 716 (1986). 
86. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspec· 
tives on Innovation, 16 CAL. L. R.Ev. 803, 821 (1988); William A. Morrison, Note, The Impact 
of the Creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the Availability of Prelimi· 
nary Injunctive Relief Against Patent Infringement, 23 INo. L. R.Ev. 169, 196 (1990) (finding 
post-Federal Circuit success rate for preliminary injunctions of 52%, which author found to 
be a statistically significant increase from the 36% rate from the preceding 29 years). Epic 
Metals Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989), is representative of this 
sea change. 
87. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261). 
88. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 228 U.S.P.Q. 305, 344 (D. Mass. 1985) (empha· 
sis added) (quoting Smith Intl., Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
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The injunctive preference also grows out of a judicial misconception 
that denying injunctive relief (and making the potential infringer 
liable only for monetary damages) would cause unconstrained in­
fringement. In 1987, the Federal Circuit found that absent injunc­
tive relief, "patent rights will be flagrantly violated."89 Especially 
for the judges of the Federal Circuit, the decision to deny injunctive 
relief is a decision to reduce substantially the expected profits of the 
patentee: 
The grant of a patent is the grant of the right . . .  to exclude others 
. . . . Without this injunctive power of the courts, the right to exclude 
granted by the patent would be diminished, and the express purpose 
. . . to promote the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously 
undermined . . . .  Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to 
exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the 
value it was intended to have . . . . 9° 
But our model has shown that even uncertain ex post enforcement 
will give rise only to limited amounts of infringement that need not 
substantially reduce the expected profitability of the patent. Poten� 
tial infringers will see that as they compete down the market price 
they will be reducing the profitability of additional infringement 
and exacerbating the damages they will have to pay if the patent is 
ultimately enforced. Therefore, uncertain enforcement need not 
open a floodgate of infringement. Instead of taking an essentialist 
view that the "very nature" of property entails the right to exclude, 
we suggest that the nature of patents should entail offering suffi­
cient rewards to stimulate innovation. Uncertain monetary dam­
ages - possibly combined with extended durations - are sufficient 
to achieve this end. 
Doctrinally, the Federal Circuit has created a presumption that 
infringement will irreparably harm patentees. This presumption in­
creases the risk that invalid patents will be enforced (Type II uncer­
tainty). Our analysis suggests, however, that it would be wiser to 
shift toward a system with larger Type I uncertainty and smaller 
Type II uncertainty. Flo-Con Systems, Inc. v. Leco Corp.91 provides 
an example of one potential shift in this direction. In Flo-Con, the 
court denied the patentee (Flo-Con) a preliminary injunction, and 
1983)). But see Atari Corp. v. Sega of Am., 869 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying 
preliminary injunction in part because 1200 permanent jobs would be lost). 
89. H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
90. Smith Intl, Inc., 718 F.2d at 1577-78. 
91. 845 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1993). 
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instead ordered the potential infringer (Leco) to put into escrow a 
litigation bond: 
A more workable solution than the blanket prohibition requested by 
Flo-Con is to require that Leco remit monthly payments to the regis­
try of the Court similar to those it would make under a license agree­
ment. Requiring the submission of such monthly payments assures 
compensation to Flo-Con if it prevails on the merits but avoids the 
problems associated with a blanket injunction - that is, it allows 
Leco to continue its presence in the marketplace and preserves the 
benefits of competition. 92 
Preliminary injunctions tend to resolve Type I uncertainty and pro­
hibit interim infringement, leaving patent holders free to charge the 
monopoly price. Increasing the patent holders' burden to justify 
injunctions can promote competition and still preserve significant, 
but restricted, ex post protections. 
In the pharmaceutical arena, the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (known as the Hatch­
Waxman Amendments )93 marks an analogous shift toward some­
thing very akin to preliminary injunctions. Hatch-Waxman allows 
the owner of a patented drug to stay for thirty months the FDA's 
approval of any generic application to produce the same drug -
even if the generic's application claims that the initial patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the patented drug for which the 
applicant seeks approval.94 Because a pharmaceutical manufac­
turer faces severe penalties for producing a drug without FDA ap­
proval, the thirty-month stay provides the patent owner with 
preliminary injunction protection. This aspect of the amendment is 
likely to reduce Type I uncertainty. 
Moreover, parts of Hatch-Waxman have the effect of reducing 
the effective patent life. A safe-harbor provision in the Act allows 
generic manufacturers to engage in conduct "reasonably related" to 
obtaining regulatory approval for producing a version of a currently 
patented drug without infringing the patent.95 This safe-harbor 
provision and other provisions shorten the effective duration of 
pharmaceutical patents by allowing generic manufacturers to file 
92. 845 F. Supp. at 1583 (emphasis added). 
93. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). 
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 355G){2)(A)(vii), {5)(B)(iii) (1994). This 30-month stay may be short­
ened by the court if the patent owner does not act reasonably or if the court finds the patent­
in-suit is not infringed or is invalid. See 21 U.S.C. § 355G)(5){B)(iii). 
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 271{e){l) {1994); see also Brian D. Coggio & Francis D. Cerrito, The 
Application of the Patent Laws to the Drug Approval Process (Andrews Pharmaceutical, New 
York), Aug. 1997, at 12,421. 
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abbreviated applications for FDA approval, which facilitates the 
ability of competitors to begin selling generics soon after an original 
patent has expired instead of having to wait until the patent expires 
_ 
to prepare to seek FDA approval.96 
Together these two aspects of Hatch-Waxman trade enhanced 
preliminary injunction protection in the short run for decreased ef­
fective patent duration. Our analysis suggests moving in just the 
opposite direction. Instead of using the requirement of FDA ap­
proval to eliminate interim infringement, we suggest that it might 
be better to allow limited interim infringement of generics and to 
compensate patentees with longer effective patent lengths. 
B. Vesting Decisionmaking Authority in Less Specialized Hands 
A major rationale for the creation of the Federal Circuit was to 
reduce uncertainty in the adjudication of appellate patent issues by 
vesting jurisdiction over all intermediate appeals in one specialized 
court. Commentators seem to agree that the court has been "suc­
cessful" in reducing uncertainty - making patent litigation more 
predictable.97 This is especially true because the Supreme Court 
rarely reverses Federal Circuit decisions - effectively making the 
Federal Circuit the centralized final arbiter of patent law. More­
over, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed a Federal Circuit 
decision that shifts decisionmaking power from juries to judges -
by redefining questions of fact as questions of law.98 Both of these 
reallocations of authority from nonspecialist judges and juries to 
the specialist Federal Circuit presumptively reduce the uncertainty 
of patent law - for the simple reason that specialists with greater 
knowledge and a thicker stock of precedent are more likely to rule 
consistently than nonspecialist decisionmakers who must first at­
tempt to learn a rarely encountered and complicated body of statu­
tory and common law. But as emphasized above, it is important to 
assess the effect of the Federal Circuit's increasing power on the 
relative mix of Type I and Type II uncertainty. 
96. It should be emphasized, however, that other aspects of the Act were designed to 
increase the effective duration of pharmaceutical patents. See 35 U .S.C. § 156 (compensating 
patentees for the patent life that erodes during FDA review by adding to the patent term an 
amount of time roughly commensurate with the review period). 
97. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6-25 (1989). 
98. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384-91 (1996) (hold­
ing that the interpretation of patent claim terms is the exclusive province of the court). 
Markman may also increase the use of interlocutory appeals to the Federal Circuit and thus 
- contrary to the themes of this Article - may speed the judicial award of preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief. 
1024 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:985 
Several commentators have emphasized that the decisions of the 
Federal Circuit are not just more predictable, but more pro­
patent.99 Scholars, for example, have estimated the Federal Circuit 
invalidates patents at substantially lower rates than did courts in the 
pre-Federal Circuit era.1°0 This suggests that the Federal Circuit 
has not just moved to reduce uncertainty generally, but instead has 
worked to reduce Type I uncertainty much more than rype II un­
certainty. Especially when combined with the strong preference for 
injunctive relief, this shift in enforcement runs against the implica­
tions of our model. 
C. Preferring Underinclusive Standards to Either Overinclusive 
Standards or Rules 
Our model suggests that underinclusive standards are likely to 
be more efficient than either rules or overinclusive standards. 
"Standards" (which can only be discovered ex post) are preferable 
to "rules" (which can be predicted ex ante) because standards 
create both the. uncertainty and delayed ex post determination 
necessary to cause limited infringement.101 And underinclusive 
standards are likely to create more Type I uncertainty (which we 
favor) than Type II uncertainty (which we disfavor). 
For example, the four-part test for "nonobviousness"102 may be 
the type of standard that creates both types of uncertainty - and 
which therefore has mixed efficiency qualities. But Professor 
Merges has argued that the commercial success doctrine - one of 
the four tests for nonobviousness - "grant[s] what amounts to a 
99. See Merges, supra note 86, at 822-23; Morrison, supra note 86, at 187-88 (concluding 
that availability of preliminary injunctive relief against patent infringement has increased 
since the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
100. See Merges, supra note 86, at 822 ("Between 1982 and 1985, the court invalidated 
only forty-four percent of the patents it adjudicated on appeal from trial courts, a marked 
contrast to the old invalidation rate of approximately sixty-six percent." (footnote omitted)); 
cf Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. 
PAT. OFF. SoCY. 758, 760 (1974) (showing high rates of patent invalidation in courts before 
the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
101. See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. 
CAL. INTERD1sc. L.J. 1, 15-17 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 559-60, 565-66 (1992). 
102. To be valid a patent needs to be "nonobvious," a requirement that currently forces 
courts to consider (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in 
the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) the sec­
ondary or objective evidence of nonobviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
17-18 (1966); Michael J. Meurer, The Nonobviousness Standard and the Optimal Probability 
of Patent Validity (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Having a pat­
ent's nonobviousness turn on the degree of ultimate commercial success may also induce ex 
ante uncertainty. See Merges, supra note 86, at 824-26. 
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quasi-presumption of patentability."1°3 This position is consonant 
with the Federal Circuit's general pro-patent leanings, and it sug­
gests that expanding the "nonobviousness" standard into new areas 
of enforcement is likely to be overinclusive. Rebuttable presump­
tions of patentability or preliminary injunctive relief are likely to 
decrease the risk of not enforcing valid patents (Type I uncertainty) 
and increase the risk of enforcing invalid patents (Type II 
uncertainty). 
To see the disparate effects of over- and underinclusive stan­
dards on Type I and Type II uncertainty, it is particularly useful to 
contrast the effects of the "doctrine of equivalence" and the "re­
verse doctrine of equivalence." Under the doctrine of equivalence, 
courts may find infringement even though the accused product 
avoids the literal description of the patent claim.104 But under the 
reverse doctrine of equivalence, courts may refuse to find infringe­
ment even though the accused product falls within the letter of the 
patent claim - so long as the accused product "has so far changed 
the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally 
construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention."105 Ex­
panding the current doctrine of equivalence is likely to be a move­
ment toward overinclusion, and thus reduce the risk of not 
enforcing valid patents and increase the risk of enforcing invalid 
patents. In contrast, expanding the reverse doctrine of equivalence 
is likely to be a movement toward underinclusive enforcement and 
therefore have the opposite effects.106 The thrust of our Article is 
that we can live with a standard-like expansion of the reverse doc­
trine of equivalence without seriously undermining the innovation 
incentives of patentees. 
The choice of rules versus standards also impacts the relative 
mix of Type I and Type II uncertainty. For example, an important 
implication of the Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO's) substan­
tive decision not to issue a patent is to eliminate an applicant's abil-
103. Merges, supra note 86, at 842. 
104. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34-36 (1997); 
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 2480 (1997); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1041-44 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
105. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898). 
106. Whether an expanded doctrine of equivalence actually leads to overinclusive en­
forcement turns on one's view about whether the preexisting (non-expanded) regime was 
over or underinclusive. However, even if the preexisting regime were underinclusive - so 
that "IYPe I uncertainty is likely to be larger than Type II uncertainty - expanding the doc­
trine of equivalence is likely to have the deleterious uncertainty effect of decreasing Type I 
and increasing Type II uncertainty. 
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ity to subsequently sue others for patent infringement.107 This is a 
"rule-like" effect of the current regime because it creates ex ante 
certainty that certain property is not protected. We do not favor 
underinclusive rules, because the certainty of 'fype I error would 
lead infringers to compete the market price all the way down to the 
competitive level - reducing the incentives to innovate. In con­
trast, underinclusive standards (where nonenforcement is only 
learned ex post) only induce limited amounts of infringement that 
(under the stationarity or Ramsey intuitions) need not reduce the 
innovation incentives.108 On the margin, this militates against statu­
tory or regulatory rules that are known ex ante and instead mili­
tates in favor of common law standards that often produce 
relatively delayed and uncertain adjudication - particularly if the 
common law is underinclusive. 
D. Allowing Patent Holders to Leverage Patent Market Power 
Into the Future 
While earlier sections have shown that consumers will generally 
have an incentive to trade some reduction in the patent's price for a 
longer patent,1°9 the Supreme Court has prohibited such private 
107. Unsuccessful applicants, however, do have limited rights of appeal. See 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 134, 141 (1994). 
108. Imagine, for example, that the PTO has a 5% chance of committing both 'fype I and 
'fype II error in reviewing applications - meaning that there is a 5% chance that valid appli· 
cations would be denied and a 5% chance that invalid applications would issue. Under our 
current system there would still be some uncertainty whether the PTO's 'fype II error would 
be corrected (i.e., subsequent litigation might deny enforcement to the improvidently granted 
patents). Subsequent litigation might also create some 'fype I uncertainty - in that some 
correctly issued patents might be unenforced. But by giving deference to the PTO's initial 
decision, our current system reduces an important source of 'fype I uncertainty. Reducing 
the PTO's grounds for rejecting patent applications at the margin would reduce 'fype I error 
while increasing Type I uncertainty - both on the additional patents that would be issued, 
and on the patents that would in any case have been issued but for which the issuance of a 
patent is now a weaker signal of validity. In the extreme case, the patent office would simply 
become a registry that time-stamped patent claims to create a record for subsequent adjudi­
cation of validity. 
The United States' "first to invent" standard may create both 'fype I and 'fype II uncer­
tainty as compared to the "first to file" rule used by most other nations. While the 'fype I 
uncertainty would be valuable chiefly because it creates a limited class of infringers, the 'fype 
II uncertainty may be deleterious. But see supra note 84 (discussing possible benefits of 'fype 
II uncertainty). While "first to invent" disputes are currently resolved relatively quickly by 
PTO interference proceedings, our model suggests that it might be better to have delayed 
decisionmaking by (possibly less-specialized) courts so that we could sustain the benefits of 
limited infringement for a longer period. 
109. See supra Introduction A and Section I.B. The parties could reduce distortion even 
more if the buyer paid a lump sum fee rather than a per-unit fee. However, sellers with 
patent market power may prefer royalties in order, for example, to implement second-degree 
price discrimination. 
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transactions. In Brulotte v. Thys Co., 110 the Supreme Court struck 
down as unenforceable an agreement in which a consumer agreed 
to pay a royalty for more than twenty years on its purchases of a 
patented good. The Court's decision found especially problematic 
the fact that the royalty remained constant in the years after the 
patent had expired. But our analysis suggests that the Court's con­
cern with leverage was misplaced. Negotiating a lower per-unit 
royalty in return for a longer royalty time period is likely to reduce 
the deadweight loss of supra-competitive pricing. And far from be­
ing suspect, the constancy of the royalty over time is prima facie 
consistent with the Ramsey intuition that the parties would have a 
joint interest in spreading the distortion evenly across time.111 Our 
analysis thus suggests that Brulotte should be overruled. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE OOLEMENTATIONS 
The usefulness of limiting patentees' monopoly pricing power, 
however, does not turn on this particular method of achieving this 
end. Even if uncertainty and delay induce too many other ineffi­
ciencies, policymakers might explore a range of other policy instru­
ments to reduce patent holders' monopoly power. This section first 
explores alternatives to expanded duration and then discusses two 
alternative mechanisms for restricting the market power of 
patentees. 
A. Expanding Geographic or Product Scope Instead of Duration 
The Ramsey intuition shows the utility of trading longer dura­
tion for reductions in patentee's market power. But the Kaplow 
ratio test suggests that other trades might also enhance efficiency.112 
It is generally efficient to expand a patentee's rights along the 
dimensions where the social cost per dollar of patentee profit is low 
and to contract a patentee's rights where the social costs per dollar 
of profit are high. The foregoing model showed that lengthening 
the duration right in return for a lesser pricing right was one such 
trade, but other trades are possible. 
For example, an alternative to lengthening duration may be to 
widen the geographic scope of coverage. Instead of rewarding the 
110. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
111. See Meehan v. PPG Indus., 802 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that when 
royalty payments extend unchanged beyond the life of a patent, the agreement is per se 
unlawful); Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding agree­
ment per se unlawful when pre- and postexpiration royalties are the same). 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (discussing Kaplow). 
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patentee solely through a high tax on N countries, the Ramsey intu­
ition suggests that it would be more efficient to produce an equal 
reward with a smaller tax on N + 1 countries. Thus, the United 
States might usefully spend greater effort to better enforce intellec­
tual property rights in the rest of world rather than expending effort 
to increase the chance that valid patents will be enforced with cer­
tainty at home. Unsavory distributional effects of such efforts -
particularly on less developed nations - might be compensated for 
in other ways. 
Alternatively, it might be efficient to trade reduced patentee 
market power for patent protection of a wider class of products 
than might otherwise be covered.113 Under certain conditions, 
broadening a patent's scope will be less costly (per dollar of paten­
tee profit produced) than broadening a patent's duration.114 And 
even when expanded duration is more efficient than expanded 
scope, it is still possible that expanding scope may be a more effi­
cient way of generating patentee profits than expanding a paten­
tee's power to raise price toward the monopoly level. When courts 
or lawmakers are unable to expand duration, expanding patent 
breadth may be a useful way to compensate for reductions in 
uncertainty. 
B. Partial Damages 
Giving the nonpatent holders the option of producing for a fee 
that is less than the monopoly markup would induce limited 
amounts of interim production.us The probabilistic patent model 
could itself be reinterpreted as a system in which w was interpreted 
not as a probability of enforcement but as the proportion of "make 
113. See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing this possibility); Klemperer, 
supra note 2, at 121-23 (discussing in a more general model when this is desirable). 
114. Klemperer analyzes the situations in which it is more desirable for society to reward 
a patentee through a broader scope of coverage rather than by a longer duration. See 
Klemperer, supra note 2, at 121-23. If consumers would have relatively similar valuations for 
the patented product when no close substitutes were available, but would have relatively 
dissimilar willingness to pay for the patented product if low-price close substitutes were avail­
able, then it is relatively more desirable to give the patentee control over the close substi­
tutes: that is, the patent should be broadened so that the close substitutes would infringe. If 
the opposite is true - for example, if potential consumers have varying levels of need for a 
product (because they would use it with different frequencies) but have similar strengths of 
preferences between an easy-to-learn product and harder-to-learn copies - then a longer­
lived but more narrowly construed patent covering just the "ideal" easy-to-learn product is 
socially preferred. 
115. The potential utility of compulsory licensing is discussed in Merges, Of Property 
Rules, supra note 23; Ralpli Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will It Survive in a 
Changing Marketplace? 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1986); and J.H. Reichman, Legal 
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2432 (1994). 
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patentee whole" damages that infringers would have to pay. In this 
model, interim producers would be certain to pay damages, but be­
cause the damages would not increase the patentee's payoffs to the 
monopoly level, limited amounts of infringement would occur.116 
However, unlike compulsory licenses, which set the patent royalty 
to yield a reasonable return above cost,117 this partial damages re­
gime would be set to give the patentee damages equaling a large 
proportion (on the order of say 70-90%) of the losses relative to full 
monopoly profit. And unlike current compulsory license regimes, 
the partial damages regime could estimate the award either ex post 
or concurrently as production proceeds.11s The information avail­
able to the government actor ex post would be much greater than 
with traditional compulsory licenses where the royalty is deter­
mined before production begins. 
In order for courts to implement a shift toward partial make­
whole damages, they would first need to reject the strong prefer­
ence for injunctions - especially preliminary injunctions. The es­
sentialist notion of "patents" as "property" that by nature entails 
the right to exclude has led courts to discourage interim infringe­
ment even when the consumer costs of monopoly dramatically out­
weigh the benefits to the patentee (and any plausible impact on 
innovation incentives).  If courts can free themselves of this notion, 
however, they can shift away from issuing injunctions, as the issu-
116. Protecting the patentee's entitlement with partial "liability" damages may not en­
dogenously induce the patentee to delay judgement. See generally supra section I.D (discuss­
ing factors influencing delay). If damages do not make the patentee whole, the patentee may 
prefer to gain an early injunctive decision that would give the patentee monopoly profits for 
the remainder of the patent's life. (If, however, winning judgment only gave the patentee a 
right to partial prospective damages, then the patentee would prefer delay as before.) Alge­
braically, if k is defined to be the proportion of make-whole damages that the patentee would 
receive with probability w, then the patentee's expected profits from not receiving judgment 
until the end of the patent life would only be greater than the expected profits from receiving 
probabilistic injunctive judgement immediately if: 
qpp + kw (nM - qpp) > (1 - w) 0 + IV1T"1 





= (2 - kw) 
so delaying judgment will only be the patentee's preferred strategy if: 
w < ( � ) 2 ( 1 - kw ) 2 - kw l - k  
117. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 43 (1977). 
118. If desired, there could also be a final settling up based on ex post information. Of 
course, courts could demand that infringers post interim bonds to make sure they have the 
wherewithal to ultimately pay the irx post award. 
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ance is not mandated by statute but is within the courts' equitable 
discretion. 
If courts move away from injunctive remedies, there are several 
elements of the current damages calculations that could be trans­
formed into what in effect would be a partial damages regime. Un­
like trademark and copyright law, patent law does not calculate 
damages so as to force infringers to disgorge any benefits of in­
fringement.119 The patent statute only requires that patentees be 
paid make-whole damages - that is, "damages adequate to com­
pensate for the infringement. "120 While true make-whole damages 
will still often represent what Calabresi and Melamed termed a 
"property rule," which will deter interim infringement, the methods 
of proving and calculating such damages can effectively transform 
them into a partial damages regime. For example, the widely used 
standard of Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, lnc.121 cre­
ates a standard of proof that is likely to facilitate interim 
infringement: 
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent 
the infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner 
must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of ac­
ceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and market­
ing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit 
he would have made . . . .  
When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the pat­
ent owner is entitled to a reasonable royalty. A reasonable royalty is 
an amount "which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a pat­
ented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a 
royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the 
market, at a reasonable profit. "122 
The difficulties that patentees frequently have in proving the four 
Panduit prerequisites often mean that instead of being awarded lost 
profits (what amounts to make-whole damages), patentees must 
settle for the smaller reasonable royalty measure. Our analysis sug­
gests that this is generally socially beneficial. There are several 
119. Trademark and copyright infringers are required to pay the greater of (1) what the 
rights holder lost from infringement, or (2) what the infringer gained. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) 
(1994) (copyright); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) (trademark). In our simple model, infringers 
in equilibrium disgorge all of their expected profits to the patentee. But in richer models, 
(for example, if infringers had lower costs than the patentee) not all profits from infringe­
ment would be disgorged. 
120. 35 u.s.c. § 284 (1994). 
121. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). 
122. 575 F.2d at 1156-57 (quoting Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion 
Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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other frontiers123 of the battle for lost-profit damages - including 
issues of price erosion;124 the market share rule;125 lost sales on un­
patented products;126 and poste:xpiration sales121 - where our anal­
ysis suggests that awarding lower "partial" damages might have the 
salutary effect of inducing limited amounts of infringement without 
unduly lessening innovation incentives. 
C. Duopoly Auction 
A system that required patentees to auction the right to use the 
innovation could also induce interim infringement. A patent would 
give the holder two entitlements: the right to be one of only two 
producers of the product,128 and the right to receive the proceeds 
from the auction selecting the second producer of the product. For 
concreteness, a year after receiving a patent, the government might 
auction the right to use the innovation to one additional firm. In a 
simple model, competition among firms to be the second producer 
would tend to raise the auction price sufficiently so as to give the 
patentee all of the second producer's expected profit.129 Just as in 
123. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., lNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOL­
OGY AGE 306 (1997) (notes on the Frontiers of Lost Profit Damages). 
124. Patentees at times convince courts that they have lost profits not only because they 
sold fewer items, but also because infringement erodes the market price and therefore the 
profits on the items they continue to sell. See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 
F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983). We generally favor awarding additional damages for price ero­
sion so as ultimately to limit the amount of infringement, and we would even favor a price 
erosion adjustment to the calculation of reasonable royalty. But the details of calculating the 
rate at which the erosion damages accrue must be sufficiently conservative so as not to deter 
all infringement. Judge Frank Easterbrook, sitting by designation as a district court judge, 
has laid out the most sophisticated analysis of how to go about calculating price erosion 
damages. See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. 
Supp. 1354, 1385-93 (N.D. ill. 1993). 
125. Tue Panduit test requires the absence of noninfringing substitutes. Some courts, 
however, have calculated lost profit damages where at least one seller ih a market is a nonin­
fringing competitor by assuming that the patentee's market share relative to the noninfringer 
would have remained the same in the absence of infringement. See State Indus. v. Mor-Flo 
Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
126. Patentees - under the "entire market value rule" - have recently been claiming 
damages for lost profits on unpatented components that they claim would have been made 
but for infringement of a related patented product. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 
F.2d 895, 900-01 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
127. Patentees have at times gained additional damages by arguing that infringement 
during the term of the patent gave the infringer a head start on postexpiration sales. See TP 
Orthodontics, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 1504-06 (E.D. Wis. 
1990). 
128. Tue current regime gives coinventors just this right in one situation: coinventors, as 
tenants-in-common, each own an undivided one-half interest in the patent. See Drake v. 
Hall, 220 F. 905, 906 (7th Cir. 1915). Thus, they each have a right to practice the invention 
and to exclude anyone except their fellow inventor from practicing the same. 
129. For richer models of auctions, see THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF AUCTIONS (Paul 
Klemperer ed., 1999), and Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. 
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the probabilistic regime, the patentee would earn all of the industry 
profits during the life of the patent: it would earn profits from its 
own sales directly, and profits from the other producer's sales 
through the lump sum payment that this second producer paid in 
the auction. But the market price in this duopoly would likely be 
lower than the monopoly price the patentee would charge under 
the current regime. Consumers may be better off paying duopoly 
prices for, say, twenty-three years than paying monopoly prices for 
twenty.130 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing patentees to profit from their patents furthers the val­
uable social objective of encouraging innovation. But as Louis 
Kaplow has already observed: "It is simply not true that all activi­
ties generating equal profits impose equal damages upon soci­
ety. "131 Enlightened intellectual property law will try to allow 
patentees to profit in ways that impose the smallest cost on soci­
ety.132 This Article has pointed out that the profits coming from the 
last increment of monopoly pricing impose disproportionate costs 
on society (relative to, for example, allowing the patentee to earn 
restricted periodic profits for a longer period of time). The tradi­
tional core method of rewarding innovation - allowing patent 
holders to charge a monopoly price - does not pass Kaplow's cost­
effectiveness test because patentees do not extract their reward in 
the least costly way. 
This Article has also shown that there are policy options to con­
strain patentees' pricing power that do not assume unrealistic gov­
ernment information. In particular, uncertainty and delay in patent 
EcoN. SuRv. (forthcoming May 1999). For example, the problems discussed in Paul 
Klemperer, Auction with Almost Common Values: The 'Wallet Game' and Its Applications, 
42 EuR. EcoN. REv. 757 (1998) may be important. 
130. This oligopoly auction idea is similar to the "permissive" patent proposal of La 
Manna et al., supra note 44, in that both would allow multiple producers for each innovation. 
But the purpose of permissive patents would be to reward nonplagiarist copiers for their 
attempts at innovation, while the purpose of the oligopoly auction is merely to restrict the 
exploitation of patentee power when that exploitation is not cost effective. 
Michael Kremer, supra note 54, 1146-48, suggests that the government should auction the 
monopoly right to the patent, but with some predetermined probability cancel the result of 
the auction ex post and offer to pay the patent holder the final price determined by the 
auction "times some constant markup which would reflect the typical ratio of social to pri­
vate value," Kremer, supra note 54, at 1146, in return for allowing free production of the 
innovation by all. Of course, this approach would require substantial government funds. 
131. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1821. 
132. While this Article has focused on patent law, the stationarity and Ramsey intuitions 
might also usefully inform copyright law (and possibly even trademark law). 
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litigation may have the unforeseen benefit of. restricting patentees' 
market power by inducing limited amounts of interim infringement. 
Because the infringing firms probabilistically compensate the pat­
entees (and because of the stationarity intuition), the patentees' re­
duced selling prices do not need to unduly reduce their expected 
profits. Furthermore, the government has sufficient information to 
trade-off more substantial reductions in the price of the patented 
good for an offsetting increase in the patent life. These insights 
about uncertainty and delay illuminate a number of policy ques­
tions, especially those concerning the relative advantages of prelim­
inary injunctions versus less expansive monetary damages. 
